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PREFACE
I shall be telling this with a sigh
Somewhere ages and ages hence:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I –
I took the one less travelled by,
And that has made all the difference.
from The Road Not Taken, Robert Frost (1916)
They say that writing a dissertation is a journey along a lonely road. When travelling
alone, with no one holding you back, you are more likely to head far into unknown
territory. However, as you get lost, there is no one you can turn to for help. You are
out there on your own.
It can be like that, at times, when you choose the road less travelled by. Yet, whenever
I turned for help, I found people around me who would. At those dark moments when I
was ready to give up writing a dissertation, there were people around me who convinced
me to continue. When I was in need of critical reflection, there were people around
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me who gave their sometimes harsh but always honest opinions. And when, at other
times, I proclaimed the exceptional genius of my work after a cryptic fifteen-minute
monologue that nobody could possibly follow, there were people around me who smiled
patiently.
To Tom, my supervisor, who did all of the above. You welcomed me into your group,
offering me academic shelter despite the eccentricity of my research topic. I thoroughly
enjoyed our meetings, and I cannot adequately express how thankful I am for the op-
portunity you gave me, and how much this opportunity has changed my life.
To Terry, my mentor. I remember vividly how, after arriving in Berkeley for the first
time, I was blown away by the audacity of your investigations. Now, almost nine years
later, it remains my main source of inspiration.
To John-Jules, who stimulated me to pursue a PhD. You have been there when I needed
you on every step of the way, for the past thirteen years; I cannot imagine a better pro-
fessor. To Liane, you accompanied me on the first legs of my journey, and showed how
science can be more than a profession. To Jeremy, Ty, Julie, Hajime, Spyridon, Jay,
Bob, Alok, Josh, Rodrigo, and the other Pirates, you have made Berkeley my academic
home away from home, and showed me that science can sometimes be as beautiful and
enjoyable as a good conversation.
To Mireille Hildebrandt and Simon Colton, for meticulously reviewing the original
manuscript and giving many excellent comments. To Palmyre, for helping me find my
way to Nijmegen, and for the many occasions we could share ideas. To Pim, for the
interesting discussions and joint work. To Pieter Adriaans and Marc Slors, whose work
I admire, and who were willing to take part in the opposition.
To my former and current research colleagues in Amsterdam, Nijmegen, Boston, Kelow-
na, Berkeley, Liverpool and Utrecht. In particular to Anders Bouwer, Tom Claassen,
Daniel Dennett, Joris Dormans, Stephan van der Feest, Tiha von Ghyczy, Jelle Herold,
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Daniel Karavolos, Carl Lipo, Nicole Messink, Joris Mooij, Apara Ranjan, Kees Rijsen-
brij, Riemer van Rozen, Janos Sarbo, John Searle, Manuela Ungureanu, and Tomas
Veloz. To the excellent colleagues at the game development department, for the enthu-
siasm, support, and fun you bring to the workplace every day.
To the friends who walked beside me on this remarkable journey, and made it far from
lonely. In particular to Lars Andeweg, Lieke Bartelds, Willem-Bart Bartels, Wouter
van Berkel, Lars Blaauwbroek, Arno Bode, Lubbert de Boer, Paul Brinkkemper, Michel
Crevecoeur, Martin Deen, Marcel van Dijk, Alex Drapers, Tim van Erven, Janneke
van Es, Wouter le Fe`vre, Rene Gelens, Joost van der Hagen, my Hardslag teammates,
Jasper ’t Hoen, Cornelis Huizinga, Merlijn Hurx, the staff of Cafe´ Marktzicht, Martijn
Huttenhuis, Geert Jonker, Wouter van Keulen, Stijn Kieft, Matthijs Kloosterboer, Bart
Koopman, Vinod & Bharati Mittal, Eric Lai, Sieuwert van Otterloo, the eternal legends
of Pangster’s Paradise, Rutger Rietveld, Eric Roefs, Eric Sillekens, Bram Snel, Sophia,
Garry Sotnik, Eduard Storm, Erik Tillema, Jan ‘Tjibbe’ Veenstra, Remon te Velthuis,
Daan Vrieler, Silvain van Weers, Erik ‘Wobbe’ Wesselius, and Mark Westerbeek.
To my parents, Puck and Rina, for your encouragement in every phase of my life.
To Natalie, for the way you see the good in everyone and everything.
To Emma, for all the love and happiness you bring to my life, and for supporting me
these years past. I could not have done this without you.
Thank you.
Stefan Leijnen, Utrecht
October 10, 2014
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In the beginner’s mind there are many possibilities, in the expert’s
mind there are few.
Shunryu Suzuki, 1970
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1INTRODUCTION
The word creativity has held different meanings and connotations over time. Tracing
back its etymological roots to ancient India, Greece, and Rome, to create means “to
make, produce” (Sanskrit kriya; Greek ktidzo; Latin creare) and is related to “to arise”
and “to grow” (Latin crescere). Creation, it was thought, involved the production of
artifacts in a physical sense – with observable results – through imitation or emulation.
Cognitive activities such as discovery, insight and guessing formed a separate domain,
in the same sense that private activities do not fall within the public domain [71].
Plato regarded learning as an act of remembrance (anamnesis) with the teacher
acting as a midwife for knowledge, rather than an instructor [1]. The origins of cognitive
activity were attributed to divine nous; a theological connotation that was carried over
to the Middle Ages, where creation ex nihilo was explained by divine inspiration, a
meaning reflected today by the word ‘creationism’ that arose around 1880 as a reaction
to Darwinism.
During the humanistic revolution of the Renaissance, and later, the Enlightenment,
the causal locus of creativity shifted from the immaterial to the physical domain. Imag-
ination as the origin of ideas bridged the dualistic gap between physical and cognitive
production, made famous by Descartes’ “Cogito ergo sum”. Some early 20th century
scientists would report on their creative process through introspection [65]. One often
mentioned introspective report has German organic chemist August Kekule´ accounting
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for his invention of the benzene ring:
“I was sitting writing at my textbook but the work did not progress; my
thoughts were elsewhere. I turned my chair to the fire and dozed. Again
the atoms were gamboling before my eyes. This time the smaller groups kept
modestly in the background. My mental eye, rendered more acute by the re-
peated visions of the kind, could now distinguish larger structures of manifold
confirmation: long rows, sometimes more closely fitted together all twining
and twisting in snake like motion. But look! What was that? One of the
snakes had seized hold of its own tail, and the form whirled mockingly before
my eyes. As if by a flash of lightning I awoke.” [135]
In this succinct account, several aspects of creativity are brought to light. Kekule´
describes how his insight finally emerged when his thoughts diverged away from the
problem at hand (‘my thoughts were elsewhere’) after a period of preparation (‘again
the atoms’; ‘repeated visions of the kind’). He also describes how cross-domain transfer
helped him conceive his idea: the flames are associated with twisting snakes that are,
in turn, associated with configurations of atoms. And finally, the ‘flash of lightning’
refers to the sudden insight he acquired in a relatively short timespan.
1.1 Science and Philosophy of Creativity
Early in the 20th century, as psychology grew into an academic discipline, imagina-
tion, preparation and other aspects of the creative process became subject to scientific
scrutiny. Introspective accounts of scientists’ and artists’ creative processes were col-
lected and analyzed, culminating in a general theory of creativity that consisted of five
subsequent stages [164]:
1. preparation: knowledge of the problem domain is acquired
2. incubation: acquired knowledge is (unconsciously) internalized
3. intimation: new insights indicate that the problem may be solved soon
4. illumination: a possible solution emerges
5. verification: the solution is validated by applying it
2
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In Wallas’ five stage model, creativity is equated with scientific discovery – and under-
standably so, considering the inspiration for his model. Yet, creativity “[...] a particular
form of taxation, a particular style of painting or dancing, a way of building a bridge or
skinning a cat, a millinery design [...]” [14]. It can be argued that, indeed, some level
of creativity is necessary for many everyday activities. How can people write grocery
lists without using their imagination? Shakespeare is believed to have added over 1700
new words to the English language, but someone engaging in a casual conversation is
also constructing new sentences on the fly, some of which may never have been uttered
before. Both eminent grandmasters and less talented chess players had to learn the
rules of the game, although they may use a different level of creativity to use them.
To distinguish between the creative outburst of recognized geniuses like Kekule´,
Shakespeare, Mozart and Picasso [144] and everyday creativity [131], the terms “big
C creativity” and “small c creativity” [94] are often used. These labels are sometimes
difficult to apply. For example, it cannot be ruled out that Albert Einstein ever wrote a
grocery list, and in doing so demonstrate a capacity for small c creativity. Vincent van
Gogh only became recognized as an eminent artist after his death – inspiring hope for
later artists that their presumed eminence will be recognized after their lifetime as well.
The phlogiston theory, providing a scientific explanation for combustion, was thought
to be an eminent discovery in the 17th century, only to become a prototype example
of science theories proved false since its 18th century demise instigated by Antoine
Lavoisier’s experiments. However, despite these and similar difficulties in distinguishing
eminent from everyday creativity, psychometric and psychosocial research [72, 143]
shows that the origins of genius and the fruits of its labor can be categorized and
studied scientifically.
A related distinction can be made between creative acts that are historically new to
society (H-creativity) and those that are merely new on a personal level (P-creativity)
[15]. From this definition it follows that all H-creative acts are P-creative, but not
all P-creative acts are H-creative. Here, too, the distinction between individual and
society is more troublesome than it may appear at first sight, as the difference between
individuals and the societies dissolves when we regard people as the fabric of society
[49].
In these definitions, a pivotal aspect of creativity presents itself. In considering the
relation between H-creativity and P-creativity, a hierarchical shift is necessary from the
3
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level of the individual to the level of a society that is composed of individuals. A similar
hierarchical shift is possible between individuals and the cells and molecules they are
composed of; at this biochemical level, it would be intuitively undesirable to attribute
creativity to, say, individual neurons. Unless some minimum requirement for creative
acts is adopted, we risk confusing creativity with pancreativity - the idea that every
event is principally unique, new, and therefore produced by a creative act. Therefore,
any scientific theory of creativity needs to adequately explain why atoms, molecules
and neurons are not creative, while humans and societies are. This fundamental idea is
captured in the distinction between unintended, purposeful, and original creative acts
[77] (see figure 1.1).
Unintended 
Purposeful 
Original 
Creative acts 
Figure 1.1: Venn diagram of three classes of acts. Unintended acts lack purpose, while
purposeful acts may or may not be original (i.e. new to a group), roughly corresponding
to H-creativity and P-creativity.
What separates purposeful and original acts from new but unintended acts is their
value and intelligibility [76] to the actor, or their compliance with an appropriateness
criterion [151]. Extrinsic independence (i.e. from environmental causation) and intrin-
sic independence (i.e. spontaneity) is required for purposeful novelty creation [99]. For
example, it would be a trivial exercise to make a computer print Marcel Proust’s “A
la recherche du temps perdu” on a display – it would constitute an unintended cre-
ative act that lacks intrinsic and extrinsic independence. Considering the mechanical
4
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computational process in isolation, the program’s execution lacks spontaneity; when
we consider the human programmer to take part in the creative process to allow for
spontaneity, the program itself is no longer extrinsically independent.
Purpose is embedded in every intended creative act. Goals, solutions, or (aesthetic)
values are a systemic aspect of every intended act of creation. The requirements for
purposeful creative acts can therefore be expressed in the following terms [15, 77, 120,
151]:
• novelty: not existing previous to the creative act.
• usefulness: being appropriate to the creative system’s goals, problems, or values;
• surprise: the recognition that an act is both new and useful.
The ex nihilo production of observable artifacts, thought to arise from divine inspiration
many centuries ago, is re-presented here as purposeful novelty creation; the creator
recognizing both the newness and usefulness of its creative act. Many theories of
creativity reflect these minimum requirements in one way or another, as they explain
novelty as a combination of previously unconnected ideas through bisociation [96] or
conceptual blending [47], usefulness as a fitness function over a set of random ideas
[22, 145], or surprise as learning optimization [24, 52, 138].
1.2 Artificial Creativity
The invention of the universal computer, first as a mechanical and later as an electronic
device, introduced an entirely new experimental facility for scientific research: a theo-
retical model could now be put to the test by means of simulation and comparing the
calculated outcomes to what the model predicted. Many would argue that computers
are capable of typically human traits such as intelligent behavior, language use, and
creativity [160], cf. [139]. Or that, if not autonomously capable of human-like behavior,
they can at least assist us in these domains. Chess programs, for example, exhibit all of
these three types: they can autonomously play against human players, suggest moves
to human players, or provide insight into the cognitive efforts involved when people
play chess.
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With respect to creativity, Lady Ada Lovelace, daughter of the poet Lord Byron and
commonly believed to be the first computer programmer, wrote in 1843: “The Ana-
lytical Engine has no pretensions whatever to originate any thing. It can do whatever
we know how to order it to perform. It can follow analysis; but it has no power of
anticipating any analytical relations or truths. Its province is to assist us in making
available what we are already acquainted with.” [101]. This is a remarkable passage
considering how, in the early days of AI, artificial intelligence and artificial creativity
were almost synonymous [18, 116]. The proposal for the 1956 Darthmouth conference
which marks the birth of artificial intelligence as a research field contains the following
excerpt:
7. Randomness and Creativity
A fairly attractive and yet clearly incomplete conjecture is that the difference
between creative thinking and unimaginative competent thinking lies in the
injection of some randomness. The randomness must be guided by intuition to
be efficient. In other words, the educated guess or the hunch include controlled
randomness in otherwise orderly thinking. [114]
The phrase ‘randomness must be guided by intuition to be efficient’ conceals a number
of difficult challenges, as it loosely suggests that novelty requires randomness and refers
to usefulness in terms of efficiency. Since 1956, many computer programs have been
made to model novelty, usefulness, surprise, randomness, intuition, or efficiency, in one
way or another. Examples include programs that produce visual art [26, 31], music
[167], poetry [63], puns [12], mathematical concepts [29], and metaphors [80].
Whether or not computer programs (e.g. fig. 1.2 and fig. 1.3) ought to be considered
as creative systems is a question open for debate, where the answer also depends on
the method of evaluation. In an experimental setup similar to the Turing test [160],
products created by artificial systems may be subjected to human evaluation [19]. To
avoid the possible bias of the human observer that computers can’t be creative, the
process by which the product was created should be unknown (cf. [30]). Within this
experimental framework, the necessary requirement for computational creativity is “the
performance of tasks which, if performed by a human, would be deemed creative” [166].
A different method for evaluating the creativity of artificial systems is by observing
the mechanical or emergent processes that they are composed of, to define the min-
6
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Figure 1.2: Graphic art created by AARON [26]
Q: What is the difference between leaves and a car?
A: One you brush and rake, the other you rush and brake.
Q: What do you call a strange market?
A: A bizarre bazaar.
Q: What kind of murderer has moral fibre?
A: A cereal killer.
Figure 1.3: Punning riddles created by JAPE [12].
imal process requirements for creativity. Creative programs often generate, evaluate
and select artifacts; some execute this task autonomously, while others require human
interaction to account for the necessary ‘guided intuition’, or purpose, in their creative
process. While the interplay between computers and humans provides an interesting
perspective on their joint creative process – some computer artists even express a de-
sire to extend interactivity and include the audience’s experiences in the creative loop
(Frieder Nake, pers. com.) – the systemic aspects of autonomous artificial creativity,
and the scientific and philosophical implications of this possibility, are considered in
the next section.
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1.3 Creativity & Constraint
Consider the following puzzle: nine dots are drawn on a piece of paper as shown in
figure 1.4. You are challenged to connect these dots by drawing four straight lines,
without lifting your pencil from the paper.
Figure 1.4: The nine dots puzzle.
A solution is presented in figure 1.5. The nine dots puzzle originally appeared as the
“Christopher Columbus’s egg puzzle” in the 1914 Cyclopedia of Puzzles [111] and is
believed to have inspired the aphorism “thinking outside the box”, which has become
a common metaphor for thinking creatively. The layout of the puzzle falsely suggests
a constraint that lines need to start and end at a dot, resulting in an exhaustive search
for a solution that doesn’t exist. However, this underlying constraint is never made
explicit: it may have arisen out of convention (e.g. familiarity with similar connect-the-
dots puzzles) or from Gestalt theoretical principles (e.g. perceiving the dots grouped
together within a square). By extending the search space and allowing lines to be
drawn outside the imagined box, a previously unimaginable solution presents itself.
Thinking outside the box is reflected in a more general sense by the realization of
implicit assumptions that allows for extending or transforming the search space. The
importance of this problem for learning was already pointed out by Plato in his Meno
dialogue, as what became known as the sophistic paradox :
“And how are you going to search for [the nature of virtue] when you don’t
know at all what it is, Socrates? Which of all the things you don’t know will
you set up as target for your search? And even if you actually come across
it, how will you know that it is that thing which you don’t know?” [126]
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Figure 1.5: A solution to the nine dots puzzle.
In addressing the absence of evidence for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in 2002,
United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld rephrased Plato’s concern as fol-
lows:
“As we know, there are known knowns. There are things we know we know.
We also know there are known unknowns. That is to say, we know there are
some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the
ones we don’t know we don’t know.” [140]
Solving the nine dots puzzle requires venturing into the unknown unknown, i.e. to
explore the possibility of alternative search spaces. This meta-search problem is often
represented by three distinct types of psychological processes – or levels of surprise [15]:
• Combinatorial creativity occurs when novelty arises out of unfamiliar combi-
nations of familiar ideas;
• Exploratory creativity makes new ideas through existing conventions;
• Transformational creativity alters the conceptual space itself, such that new
ideas are generated that do not fit in a previous style or convention.
Combinatorial and exploratory creativity can be represented computationally as ran-
domized combination of existing concepts, and traversal through a predefined search
space, respectively. Simulating transformational creativity is straightforward, however,
as a distinction between the search space within the box, and the meta-search space of
possible boxes is required (fig. 1.6).
9
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Figure 1.6: Two approaches to solving the nine-dots puzzle: lines are either drawn inside
the (imagined) box formed by the dots (left), or lines are drawn outside of it as well (right).
In the former case, no solution is found, whereas in the latter case, the conceptual space
is not altered. With transformational creativity defined as thinking outside an established
search space, neither approach complies with this transformational creativity criterion.
The possibility of eliminating a self-imposed constraint, such as the virtual box that
we experience when trying (and failing) to solve this puzzle, suggests that systems may
exist which transform search spaces by generating and eliminating constraints. Such
systems are explored in the second part of this thesis, showing that creativity is both
limited and enabled by constraint.
1.4 Research Questions
The issues discussed in the previous sections lead to the following research question:
To what extent can creative processes be modeled in artificial systems?
This question is split up into three key questions, each corresponding with one part of
this thesis:
I How can historical creativity be modeled computationally as an evolutionary pro-
cess in an artificial agent society, and given this model, what parameter settings
10
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optimize the fitness and diversity of ideas?
II What are the systemic requirements for artificial transformational creativity, and
how can such a system be modeled computationally?
III How can knowledge of creative processes be applied to the development of compu-
tational tools that support creativity?
1.5 Methodology
The three parts differ not only in terms of what question they resolve, but also in
the approach taken toward computational modeling, and toward what constitutes cre-
ativity. In the two chapters that form the first part, creativity is modeled as a group
process, in order to learn how innovation and imitation impact the spread of ideas
among a society of interacting agents. As such, these chapters address issues of his-
torical creativity, though not necessarily of Big-C ideas: small, incremental steps that
improve the usefulness of ideas are considered to be creative, just as giant leaps are.
Whereas in the first part, the distinction between unintended and purposeful actions
is bracketed out (c.f. fig. 1.1), this distinction resurfaces in the three chapters that
follow in the second part. In order to accurately model transformational creativity, the
evaluation of value can no longer be delegated to an externally imposed fitness criterion;
rather, this evaluation needs to form an intrinsic part of the model for the autonomous
production of constraints to be transformationally creative. Computation, here, proves
to be a tool rather than a model, as computer simulation allows for a non-computational
system to be modeled in chapter 6.
Part III, finally, considers creativity support tools in two domains: archeology and
video game development. The first chapter features a program for the automated
classification of material artifacts, known as cladistics, that relies on conceptual, rather
than phylogenetic, artifact attributes. This chapter, creativity features in threefold: the
tool automatically creates suggestions for inheritance trees; it supports the generation of
new and original models of cultural inheritance by archeologists; and third, the artifacts
are themselves products of prehistoric invention. The second chapter of this part looks
at tools for automated content generation for games. Considering the troublesome
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relation between computation and transformational creativity discussed in the second
part, the applied techniques are limited to combinatorial and exploratory (rather than
transformational) creativity.
1.6 Outline of the Thesis
Part I: Creativity in an Artificial Agent Society features a computer model of
cultural evolution referred to as EVOC (for EVOlution of Culture), which incorporates
cultural analogies of biological epistasis, mutation, and crossover of coded instructions.
The benefits and drawbacks of H-creativity are analyzed at the level of agent groups,
where some neural network-based agents invent new ideas through modification of
existing ideas, while others merely imitate their neighbors’ ideas. Although imitation
appears to be a form of free-riding on the originality of others, the behavior of these
imitator agents is essential as they help prevent the breaking up of co-adapted partial
solutions. In Chapter 2: Creation and Imitation in a Multi-Agent System, the
EVOC model and architecture are described, while Chapter 3: Cultural Evolution
in EVOC presents a series of experiments investigating the optimal proportion of
creative types to imitators in society, the optimal innovation rate of creatives, the
effect of clustering creative agents together, time series analyses of the relation between
innovator-to-imitator ratios and innovation rates, and the impact of creative leadership.
Within the EVOC framework, purpose is simulated by random variation in a neural
network. Part II: Creativity and Constraint looks at the causal locus of novelty
and usefulness, and the emergent dynamics that may ultimately be required for trans-
formational creativity. In Chapter 4: Creating Symbols, the difference between
indexical and symbolic interpretation is explored using a neural network simulation of
chimpanzee language training experiments - crossing the symbolic threshold is perhaps
the ultimate transformationally creative act. Following a series of experimental results,
the systemic requirements for crossing this threshold are discussed. These requirements,
and the closely related question whether computers can accurately model systems capa-
ble of symbolic interpretation, is what originally gave rise to the investigations reported
in the two chapters that follow.
The limitations of computational models of emergent and hierarchical dynamics are
investigated further in Chapter 5: Computation, Creativity and Constraint.
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For a system to change its own conceptual space, it needs to be capable of producing
constraints that are new and useful to itself. This requirement is discussed briefly with
respect to the fixed constraints required to execute computational mechanisms.
The questions and challenges raised in these two previous chapters are then subject
of the central piece of this Part, Chapter 6: Constraint, Self-Organization and
Autogenesis. Just as EVOC frames historical creativity in terms of evolutionary bi-
ology, so is the Autogenic Automaton, a computer model of presented and discussed
in this chapter, tied to a biological framework: it shows how novelty and usefulness
may arise spontaneously through the abiogenic generation, elimination, preservation
and selection of constraints. The chapter presents a simulation of an autogenic sys-
tem, a hierarchical model of emergent dynamics that exemplifies the preservation of
accumulated constraints as resulting from a reciprocal coupling between self-organizing
processes. Origins of life theories often employ self-organization to account for the
formative power [91] that produces life seemingly out of nothing. However, how the
constraints produced by self-organization are maintained and preserved over timespans
stretching long enough for evolutionary selection dynamics to occur is currently not
well-understood. We show that this coupling produces a second order constraint that
can resist dissipation and become replicated in new substrates over time.
Part III: Creativity Support Tools features Chapter 7: Chronicling Cul-
tural Ancestry through Conceptual Classification, where a tentative program is
described that suggests patterns of cultural ancestry from archeological artifacts based
on their conceptual attributes (e.g. information about their function) in addition to
quantitative attributes such as their size and shape. Chapter 8: Creativity in Pro-
cedural Content Generation for Video Games investigates how knowledge about
creative processes may be applied to improve procedural content generation tools and
techniques. Using a program called Ludoscope that uses transformational grammars
to generate content, we find that separating generation and resolution of the proposed
solutions into a dual process facilitates the design of algorithms and impacts the design
of PCG tools.
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CREATIVITY IN AN ARTIFICIAL AGENT
SOCIETY
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2CREATION AND IMITATION IN A
MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM
There are both benefits and drawbacks to creativity. In a social group it is not necessary
for all members to be creative, to benefit from creativity. Some seem to merely adopt
and free-ride on innovations achieved by others; in reality, however, their behavior is
essential. This chapter1 describes a simulation of cultural evolution referred to as EVOC
(for EVOlution of Culture). EVOC is composed of neural network-based agents that
evolve fitter ideas for actions by inventing new ideas through modification of existing
ones, and imitating neighbors’ ideas.
2.1 Introduction
Computer science is drawing ever more extensively upon the natural world for inspira-
tion in the design of search algorithms, optimization tools, problem solving techniques,
and even computer-based artistic expression. What nature - a most effective problem
solver - has come up with is the human mind itself. The brain’s effectiveness derives
largely from the fact that it is endlessly creative, able to break out of ruts and come
1This chapter is based on [106] Leijnen, S. and Gabora, L. (2009). How creative should creators be
to optimize the evolution of ideas? A computational model. EPTCS, 9 :108–119.
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up with ideas and solutions that are new, useful, and appealing. Not only are we in-
dividually creative, but we build on each other’s creations such that over the centuries
our ideas and inventions can be said to have evolved. In order for computer scientists
to put to use the process by which creative ideas evolve through cultural exchange we
must first develop better computational representations of the process. This chapter
investigates one of its aspects: the interaction between how creative individuals are,
and how numerous they are in a society.
Our capacity for self-expression, for finding practical solutions to problems of sur-
vival, and coming up with aesthetically pleasing objects that delight the senses, all
stem from the creative power of the human mind. However, there are also consid-
erable drawbacks to creativity. An original solution to one problem often generates
other problems or unexpected negative side effects that may only become apparent
after much has been invested in the original solution. Moreover, creative individuals
are more emotionally unstable and prone to affective disorders such as depression and
bipolar disorder, and have a higher incidence of schizophrenic tendencies, than other
segments of the population [3, 50, 85, 86, 152]. They are also more prone to abuse drugs
and alcohol [68, 69, 112, 118, 119, 134] as well as suicide [70]. Also, creative people
often feel disconnected from others because they defy the crowd [150, 153]. Fortunately,
in a group of interacting individuals, only a fraction of them need be creative for the
benefits of creativity to be felt throughout the group. The rest can reap the benefits
of the creators’ ideas without having to withstand the dark aspects of creativity by
simply copying, using, or admiring them. After all, few of us know how to build a
computer, or write a symphony, or a novel, but they are nonetheless ours to use and
enjoy when we please. In a society of interacting individuals capable of imitation, some
members can capitalize on the benefits of creativity without incurring the drawbacks
by merely imitating their creative peers. This opens up some interesting questions. In
order for a culture to evolve optimally - in terms of collectively exploring the space
of possible solutions - what is the ideal ratio of creators to imitators? Secondly, how
creative should these ‘creative types’ be?
We have investigated these questions using an agent-based modeling approach. The
agents are too rudimentary to suffer any of these affective penalties of creativity. We
focus on two negative consequences that are much more straightforward and no less
relevant. First, innovation is a slow and frustrating process. Only few innovators are
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lucky enough to progress quickly, the rest are struggling and straggling behind. Unless,
of course, they too get a chance to imitate what their best peers have achieved and build
on that. In other words, it is not only the imitators who can benefit from copying; most
innovators do so too. Second, and related to the above, an excess of creative agents too
fully engaged in the process of invention become effectively insulators or blockages in
the rapid diffusion of the best ideas. If so, they hurt themselves just as much as their
‘lesser’ imitating brethren.
Whereas in the earliest versions of the computer model used here, all agents were
equally capable of both inventing and imitating [53], in a subsequent version greater
individualization was possible [107]. Each agent could be a pure imitator, a pure
creator, or something in between. We found that for low probabilities of invention for
creators, the mean fitness of ideas increased as a function of the percentage of creators
in the society, but for higher invention probabilities, the optimal ratio of creators to
imitators followed a nonlinear decreasing function. Thus as a general rule, the more
creative the creators were, the less numerous they should be. In this chapter and the
next, we report on a much more extensive investigation that employs a more detailed
and sophisticated analysis of these questions.
2.2 The Modeling Approach
EVOC consists of neural network-based agents that invent ideas for actions, and imitate
neighbors’ actions [57]. EVOC is an elaboration of Meme and Variations, or MAV
[53], the earliest computer program to model culture as an evolutionary process in
its own right. MAV was inspired by the genetic algorithm (GA), a search technique
that finds solutions to complex problems by generating a ‘population’ of candidate
solutions through processes akin to mutation and recombination, selecting the best,
and repeating until a satisfactory solution is found. Although MAV has inspired the
incorporation of cultural phenomena (such as imitation, knowledge-based operators,
and mental simulation) into evolutionary search algorithms (e.g. [98]), the goal behind
MAV was not to solve search problems, but to gain insight into how ideas evolve. It used
neural network-based agents that could (1) invent new ideas by modifying previously
learned ones, (2) evaluate ideas, (3) implement ideas as actions, and (4) imitate ideas
implemented by neighbors. Agents evolved in a cultural sense, by generating and
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sharing ideas for actions, but not in a biological sense; they neither died nor had
offspring. The approach can thus be contrasted with computer models of the interaction
between biological evolution and individual learning [8, 9, 78, 79, 84].
MAV successfully modeled how ‘descent with modification’ can occur in a cultural
context, but it had limitations arising from the outdated methods used to program it.
Moreover, although new ideas in MAV were generated making use of acquired knowl-
edge and pattern detection, the name ‘Meme and Variations’ implied acceptance of the
notion that cultural novelty is generated randomly, and that culture evolves through
a Darwinian process operating on discrete units of culture, or ‘memes’. Problems with
memetics and other Darwinian approaches to culture have become increasingly ap-
parent [17, 51, 54, 55, 56, 87]. One problem is that natural selection prohibits the
passing on of acquired traits (thus you don’t inherit your mother’s tattoo)1. In culture,
however, ‘acquired’ change - that is, modification to ideas between the time they are
learned and the time they are expressed - is unavoidable. Darwinian approaches must
assume that elements of culture are expressed in the same form as that in which they
are acquired. Natural selection also assumes that lineages do not intermix. However,
because ideas cohabit a distributed memory with a multitude of other ideas, they are
constantly combining to give new ideas, and their meanings, associations, and implica-
tions are constantly revised. It has been proposed that what evolves through culture is
not discrete memes or artifacts, but the internal models of the world that give rise to
them [54], and they evolve not through a Darwinian process of competitive exclusion
but a Lamarckian process involving exchange of innovation protocols [55, 56]. EVOC
incorporates this in part by allowing agents to have multiple interacting needs, thereby
fostering complex actions that fulfill multiple needs. Elsewhere [57, 58] results of ex-
periments using different needs and/or multiple needs are described, as well as how
cultural evolution is affected by affordances of the agents’ world, such as world shape
and size, population density, and barriers that impede information flow, and poten-
tially erode with time. This research investigates how different proportions of creative
to uncreative agents affect the fitness and diversity of ideas.
1That isn’t to say that inheritance of acquired traits never occurs in biological evolution; it does.
However, to the extent that this is the case, natural selection cannot provide an accurate model of
biological evolution. Because inheritance of acquired traits is the exception in biology not the rule,
natural selection still provides a roughly accurate model of biological evolution.
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2.3 Architecture
This section describes the key components of the agents and the world they inhabit.
2.3.1 The World
EVOC consists of an artificial society of agents in a two-dimensional 10x10 grid-cell
world. Agents are stationary, such that agents always have the same four neighbors.
Although EVOC allows for sparse population (i.e. not every grid square contains an
agent), the world is completely populated in the experiments reported in the next
chapter.
2.3.2 The Agent
Agents consist of (1) a neural network, which encodes ideas for actions and detects
trends in what constitutes a fit action using knowledge based operators, and (2) a
body, which implements actions.
In each iteration, every agent has the opportunity to (1) acquire an idea for a new
action, either by imitation, copying a neighbor, or by invention, creating one anew, (2)
update the knowledge-based operators, and (3) implement a new action. To invent a
new idea, the current action is copied to the input layer of the neural network, and this
previous action is used as a basis from which to generate a new one. For each node the
agent makes a probabilistic decision as to whether change will take place. If it does, the
direction of change is stochastically biased by the knowledge-based operators using the
activations of the SYMMETRY and MOVEMENT nodes. Mental simulation is used to
determine whether the new idea has a higher fitness than the current action. If so, the
agent learns and implements the action specified by the new idea. To acquire an idea
through imitation, an agent randomly chooses one of its four neighbors, and evaluates
the fitness of the action the neighbor is implementing using mental simulation. If its
own action is fitter than that of the neighbor, it chooses another neighbor, until it has
either observed all of its immediate neighbors, or found one with a fitter action. If
no fitter action is found, the agent does nothing. Otherwise, the neighbor’s action is
copied to the input layer, learned, and implemented.
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2.3.2.1 The Neural Network
The core of an agent is a neural network, as shown in figure 2.1. It is composed of
six input nodes that represent concepts of body parts (LEFT ARM, RIGHT ARM,
LEFT LEG, RIGHT LEG, HEAD, and HIPS), six matching output nodes, and six
hidden nodes that represent more abstract concepts (LEFT, RIGHT, ARM, LEG,
SYMMETRY and MOVEMENT). Input nodes and output nodes are connected to ‘hid-
den’ nodes of which they are instances (e.g. RIGHT ARM is connected to RIGHT.)
Activation of any input node increases activation of the MOVEMENT hidden node.
Opposite-direction activation of pairs of limb nodes (e.g. leftward motion of one arm
and rightward motion of the other) activates the SYMMETRY node. The neural net-
work learns ideas for actions. An idea is a pattern of activation across the output nodes
consisting of six elements that instruct the placement of the six body parts.
The neural network starts with small random weights, and input patterns that
represent ideas for actions are presented to the network. Ideas are learned by training
the network for 50 iterations using the generalized learning rule [33]. Each time an
input pattern is presented, the network’s actual output is compared to the desired
output. An error term is computed, which is used to modify the connectivity in the
network such that its responses become more correct. Since the neural network is an
autoassociator, training continues until the output is identical to the input, at which
point the training stops. The value of using a neural network is that trends about
what makes for a fit action can be detected using the symmetry and movement nodes
(see below). The neural network can also be turned off to compare results to those
obtained using a simple data structure that cannot detect trends, and thus invents
ideas at random.
2.3.2.2 Knowledge-based Operators
Brains detect regularity and build schemas with which they adapt the mental equiva-
lents of mutation and recombination to tailor actions to the situation at hand. Thus
they generate novelty strategically, on the basis of past experience. Knowledge-based
operators are a crude attempt to incorporate this into the model. Since a new idea
for an action is not learned unless it is fitter than the currently implemented action,
newly learned actions provide valuable information about what constitutes an effective
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Figure 2.1: The neural network.
idea. This information is used by knowledge-based operators to probabilistically bias
invention such that new ideas are generated strategically as opposed to randomly. Thus
the idea is to translate knowledge acquired during evaluation of an action into educated
guesses about what makes for a fit action. Two heuristics are used. The first is: if
movement is generally beneficial, the probability increases that new actions involve
movement of more body parts. Each body part starts out at a stationary rest position,
and with an equal probability of changing to movement in one direction or the other.
If the fitter action codes for more movement, increase the probability of movement of
each body part. Do the opposite if the fitter action codes for less movement.
This heuristic is based on the assumption that movement in general (regardless of
which particular body part is moving) can be beneficial or detrimental. This seems like
a useful generalization since movement of any body part uses energy and increases the
likelihood of being detected. It is implemented as follows:
P+(i) =
{
max(1, P+(i) + 0.1) for An ≥ Ac
min(0, P+(i)− 0.1) for An < Ac (2.1)
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P−(i) = 1− P+(i) (2.2)
with Ac = movement node activation for current action, An = movement node acti-
vation for new action, P+(i) = probability of increased movement at body part i and
P−(i) = probability of decreased movement at body part i.
The second heuristic is: if fit actions tend to be symmetrical (e.g. left arm moves to
the right and right arm moves to the left), the probability increases that new actions are
symmetrical. This generalization is biologically sensible, since many useful actions (e.g.
walking) entail movement of limbs in opposite directions, while others (e.g. pushing)
entail movement of limbs in the same direction. This second heuristic is implemented
in a manner analogous to that of the first. In summary, each action is associated with
a measure of its effectiveness, and generalizations about what seems to work and what
does not are translated into guidelines that specify the behavior of the algorithm.
2.3.2.3 The Body
If the fitness of an action is evaluated to be higher than that of any action learned thus
far, it is copied from the output nodes of the neural network that represent concepts
of body parts to a six digit array that contains representations of actual body parts,
referred to as the body. Since it is useful to know how many agents are doing essentially
the same thing, when node activations are translated into limb movement they are
thresholded such that there are only three possibilities for each limb: stationary, left,
or right. Six limbs with three possible positions each gives a total of 729 possible
actions. Only the action that is currently implemented by an agent’s body can be
observed and imitated by other agents.
2.3.3 The Fitness Function
Agents evaluate the effectiveness of their actions according to how well they satisfy
needs using a pre-defined equation referred to as a fitness function. The fitness of an
action with respect to the need to attract mates is referred to as F1, and it is calculated
as in [53]:
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F1= am + 2as + i
with i = 1 if ah = 0, or i = 0 otherwise.
Here, am is the activation of the movement hidden node, as the activation of the
symmetry hidden node, and ah the activation of the head node.
F1 rewards actions that make use of trends detected by the symmetry and movement
hidden nodes and used by knowledge-based operators to bias the generation of new
ideas. The application of F1 leads to actions inspired by realistic mating displays,
and exhibits a cultural analog of epistasis. In biological epistasis, the fitness conferred
by the allele at one gene depends on which allele is present at another gene. In this
cognitive context, epistasis is present when the fitness contributed by movement of one
limb depends on what other limbs are doing. In the simulations presented in the next
chapter, F1 is used exclusively.
2.3.4 Incorporation of Cultural Phenomena
In addition to knowledge-based operators, discussed previously, agents incorporate the
following phenomena, characteristic of cultural evolution, as parameters that can be
turned off or on (in some cases to varying degrees):
• Imitation. Ideas for how to perform actions spread when agents copy neighbors’
actions. This enables them to share effective, or ‘fit’, actions.
• Invention. This code enables agents to generate new actions by modifying their
initial action or a previously invented or imitated action using knowledge-based
operators (discussed previously).
• Mental simulation. Before implementing an idea as an action, agents can use the
fitness function to assess how fit the action would be if it were implemented.
2.4 Implementation
EVOC is written in Java, an object oriented programming environment, using the
Joone open source neural network library. The graphical user interface makes use of
the open-source charting project, JFreeChart [67], enabling variables to be user defined
at run time, and results to become visible as the computer program runs (figure 2.2).
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Figure 2.2: Output panel of GUI using F1.
2.5 A Typical Run
Fitness of actions starts out low because initially all agents start out in stationary rest
positions. When an agent invents an action that has a higher fitness than doing nothing,
this action will likely get imitated, so fitness increases. Fitness increases further as other
ideas get invented, assessed, implemented as actions, and spread through imitation. The
diversity of actions initially increases due to the proliferation of new ideas, and then
decreases as agents hone in on the fittest actions.
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In the experiments reported in this chapter1, a distinction is made between two types
of agents. Whereas one kind of agent, referred to as imitators, almost always obtains
new ideas by imitating neighbors, the other type of agent, referred to as inventors or
creators, almost always obtains new ideas by inventing them. There are two negative
consequences of creativity in these simulations. The first is that an iteration spent
inventing is an iteration not spent imitating. When invention does not lead to a more
fit solution, this iteration could have spent better copying another inventor’s idea,
thereby increasing the probability of the persistence of this (potentially fitter) idea over
time. The second is that creative change can break up co-adapted partial solutions:
1The results reported in chapter were originally published in the following articles (ordered by the
section in which they appear): [107] Gabora, L. and Leijnen, S. (2009). The tradeoff between degree
of creativity and number of creators in a computational model of society. In B. Cooper and V. Danos
(Eds.) Proceedings of Developments in Computational Models: Computational Models from Nature,
July 11, 2009, Rhodes, Greece; [106] Leijnen, S. and Gabora, L. (2009). How creative should creators
be to optimize the evolution of ideas? A computational model. EPTCS, 9 :108–119; [105] Leijnen,
S. and Gabora, L. (2009). The artist loft effect in the clustering of creative types. In Creativity and
Cognition 2009 :389–390; [60] Gabora, L., Leijnen, S. and von Ghyczy, T. (2010). When Is Creativity
Too Much of a Good Thing? A Computer Simulation. In Proceedings of the 118th Annual Meeting of
the American Psychological Association, August 12-15, 2010, San Diego, CA; [61] Gabora, L., Leijnen,
S. and von Ghyczy, T. (2013). Relationship between Creativity, Imitation, and Cultural Diversity.
International Journal of Software and Informatics, 7 (4):615–627, and [108] Leijnen, S. and Gabora,
L. (2010). An agent-based simulation of the effectiveness of creative leadership. In Proceedings of the
Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, August 11-14, 2010, Portland, OR:955–960.
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Figure 3.1: Action diversity after 50 iterations, for different percentages of creative agents
in a population.
maximally fit actions are ‘culturally epistatic’, in the sense that what is optimal with
respect to one part of the problem depends on what is done with respect to another
part of the problem. Once both parts of the problem have been solved in a mutually
beneficial way, too much creativity can cause these co-adapted solutions to break down.
In this model of cultural evolution, epistasis is present when the fitness contributed by
movement of one limb depends on what the other limbs are doing.
3.1 Proportion of Creators to Imitators
The first experiments show how much effect the ratio of creative individuals in a pop-
ulation has on the development of ideas. The world is not segmented, i.e. there are
no barriers as in several other EVOC experiments reported elsewhere [53]. All experi-
ments feature runs of 100 iterations and results displayed are averaged over 100 runs;
on each run the creative agents are randomly dispersed. The creative agents provide
for all the generation of new ideas, that is, imitators don’t invent. Their role is to
copy the successful innovations of other agents, and thereby serve as a ‘memory’ for
preserving the fittest configurations. In this simulation, creators always innovate and
never imitate; they have a 1:0 invention to imitation ratio. Conversely, imitators have
a 0:1 invention to imitation ratio.
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Figure 3.2: Mean fitness after 50 iterations, for different percentages of creative agents
in a population.
Figure 3.1 illustrates that the action diversity (i.e. the number of different actions that
exist in the world at a given time) in the artificial society is positively correlated with the
percentage of creators. As the proportion of creators increases, a larger fraction of the
search space is discovered. Figure 3.2 shows that although the number of configurations
increases as a function of the proportion of creators, this does not necessarily have a
beneficial effect on the mean fitness of the ideas in the society. If, for example, over
twenty percent of the population exclusively engages in creative action, and the other
eighty percent or less merely imitates, there are not enough imitators left to retain
successful actions. In the long run this causes a disadvantageous effect on the mean
fitness of ideas. The ideal population appears to consist of approximately 15% creators
and 85% imitators.
3.1.1 Clustered and Unclustered Agents with Varying Degrees of Cre-
ativity
The world we have modeled supposes that agents can either innovate or copy actions,
but not both. However, the real world is not so black-and-white; it contains individuals
in all scales of gray, with some that tend to go their own way and do their own thing
(but not always) and others that generally (but not always) follow trends. Using the
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Figure 3.3: Action diversity after 50 iterations, for different probabilities of inventing
versus imitating.
population distribution found in the previous experiment (fifteen percent creators), we
varied the extent in which creators imitate and imitators innovate by changing their
respective invention to imitation ratios. The results are depicted in figures 3.3 and 3.4.
From the results obtained after 50 iterations, the mean fitness and the action diver-
sity show no clear trend of going up or down. The scores at 50/50 (both inventors and
imitators have fifty percent probability of creating a new action) and 100/0 (inventors
have a hundred percent probability of innovating; imitators have zero percent proba-
bility of innovating) are nearly the same. It appears that what matters most to the
fitness of a population is not the number of creative individuals per se - but rather, the
number of different ideas generated regardless of whether individuals exhibit individual
differences as to their degree of creativity. As seen in figure 3.4, the diversity of ideas
is also little affected by this variable. In other words, it does not appear to matter to
the success of the society whether an idea comes from a regularly creative agent or an
agent that usually imitates; these experimental results are discussed in section 3.1.2.
But what happens to the exchange of ideas when a group of creators engages in
close interaction? It is not uncommon for creative individuals to work or live together
within a group of likeminded, equally creative people. A synergy effect may emerge.
The combined creativity of their works may benefit from such clustering. In order to
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Figure 3.4: Mean fitness after 50 iterations, for different probabilities of inventing versus
imitating.
simulate this, we predetermined the positions of agents, forcibly forming clusters of
creators or putting them far apart.
As the parameters used (percentage of inventors in a population, innovation to
imitation ratios) remain the same in between clustered and non-clustered experiments,
the difference in mean population fitness can only be caused by the relative proximity of
the creative agent (or agents). Figure 3.5 shows several world states after a number of
iterations, with varying amounts of (clustered and unclustered) innovative individuals.
The invention to imitation ratio used in these worlds was 1:0 for creative agents (and
0:1 for imitators). All novel actions are generated at one, two or three points in the
grid, and spreads out over the population. This is particularly noticeable in the first
column, where only one agent acts as a creator.
Using the rather rigid rule that creation means no imitation and imitation means
no creation, the only agents that learn (the imitators) never put their knowledge into
practice (they never invent some new action). For creative clusters to form, a certain
interplay between the creators is required; they need to be able to learn from each
other’s inventions. We therefore gave creators a twenty percent probability of imitating,
so that they had the chance to learn from their (possibly creative) neighbors. Figure 3.6
shows the results for a grid of 100 agents, of which four are creators, and figure 3.7 for
a grid with 1600 agents, of which 10 are creators.
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Figure 3.5: The development and transmission of actions in a world with 100 agents.
Different actions are represented by differently colored cells. The snapshots of the worldgrid
are ordered in time and in agent configuration. The columns indicate the state of the world
after (from top to bottom) 1, 5, 10, 15 and 20 iterations. The rows show a configuration
with (from left to right) one agent, two clustered agents, two unclustered agents, three
clustered agents and three unclustered agents. Clustered groups of agents are placed next
to each other somewhere in the (toroidal) world. Unclustered agents are placed in cells
with maximum distance from each other.
Figure 3.6: The mean fitness of ideas developing over 30 iterations with a 100 agent grid,
for clustered (solid line) and unclustered (dashed line) agents.
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Figure 3.7: Mean population fitness developing over 30 iterations on a 1600 agent grid,
for clustered (solid line) and unclustered (dashed line) agents.
These graphs show that clustering has a beneficial effect on the mean fitness of ideas in
the artificial society, though with the very large society it appears to be detrimental in
the short term. This may be because in such a large world too much clustering initially
impedes the flow of ideas from creative to uncreative agents. The effects of clustering
become more apparent in the larger grid world due to the relative distance between
unclustered agents.
3.1.2 Discussion
It is known that creativity has serious drawbacks as well as benefits. The goal of the
work reported here was to answer the question: when (if ever) does creativity become
too much of a good thing? In the experiments reported here there is no possibility of
newly invented ideas having unexpected negative side-effects or consequences. Nor is
creativity associated with affective disorders such as depression. There are only two
negative consequences of creativity in the simulations. The first is that an iteration
spent inventing is an iteration not spent imitating. The second is that creative change
can break up co-adapted partial solutions.
Previous work, using an agent-based modeling approach referred to as MAV, showed
that the ideal ratio of imitating to inventing was approximately 2:1 [53]. That is, the
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fitness of ideas evolved most quickly when in 2/3 of iterations agents invented and in
1/3 of iterations agents imitated. In these experiments with MAV, all agents were
equally capable of both inventing and imitating. In the experiments reported in this
section we used EVOC to investigate a related but different question: what proportion
of individuals should be ‘creative types’? The rationale is that it is known that in a
society of interacting individuals capable of imitation, some members can capitalize on
the benefits of creativity without incurring the drawbacks by merely imitating their
creative peers. So if only some fraction of the population is a creator, and the rest
imitators, what is the ideal ratio of creators to imitators? We found that when creators
invent 100% of the time, and imitators imitate 100% of the time, we found that the
ideal proportion is 15% creators versus 85% imitators.
Our subsequent experiment indicated that lowering the probability of inventing
for creators while simultaneously increasing the probability of inventing for imitators
(thus keeping the total amount of idea generation stable) does not have a significant
effect on either the diversity or mean fitness of ideas in the population. This might
appear to imply that it is not the creativity of individual agents that is important to
the mean fitness of ideas in a group but rather the ‘overall creativity’ that is critical.
We posited, however, the advantage of having specific individuals with more creative
capacity than others may only become apparent when these highly creative individuals
are not dispersed randomly but are close enough to one another to able to influence
each other. Thus we hypothesized by clustering creative agents in EVOC such that
they are more likely than not to be near other creators, creative ‘think-tanks’ might
emerge with particularly good ideas, which spread for the benefit of all. This turned
out to be the case. Creators and imitators alike adopted only the strongest ideas that
came out of the think tanks (since weak ideas are quickly replaced by stronger ones).
All this suggests that clustering may be a good way to maximize the mean fitness of
ideas of a population. It is likely, however, that far more intricate configurations of
agents lead to even better results. For instance, clustered individuals might influence
each other to such a great extent that only one line of thought is explored (that of ‘the
group’).
In the next sections, we will repeat the experiments undertaken to determine the
ideal proportion of creators to imitators using creators that invent less than 100% of the
time and imitators that do not imitate 100% of the time. This most extreme boundary
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condition was a good place to start, but not the most realistic. After all, in real
societies all people, no matter how much they go their own way and do their own thing,
imitate and adopt social conventions at least some of the time. Likewise no matter how
uncreative people may be, they do adapt solutions to their particular circumstances
and exhibit instances of ‘mini-c creativity’ on a daily basis. In the final section of this
chapter, the ‘broadcasting’ capability of the program is used to investigate the question
of what degree of creativity is associated with effective leadership.
3.2 Innovation Rate
The previous experiment shows how much effect the ratio of creative individuals in
a population has on the development of ideas. The creative agents provide for all
the generation of new ideas, that is, imitators don’t invent. Their role is to copy the
successful innovations of other agents, and thereby serve as a ‘memory’ for preserving
the fittest configurations. In the simulations reported in this section, the rate at which
creators innovate and imitate is varied. Imitators never innovate and always imitate.
Figure 3.8 shows that although the number of ideas increases as a function of pro-
portion of creators, this does not necessarily have a beneficial effect on the mean fitness
of the ideas in the society. If, for example, over twenty percent of the population exclu-
sively engages in creative action, and the other eighty percent or less merely imitates,
there are not enough imitators left to retain successful actions. In the long run this
causes a disadvantageous effect on the mean fitness of ideas. The ideal population
appears to consist of approximately fifteen percent creators and eighty-five percent im-
itators. When the society consists entirely of imitators, no new ideas are created and
the fitness remains the same.
Figure 3.9 illustrates that the number of different actions in the artificial society
is positively correlated with the percentage of creators. As the proportion of creators
increases, a larger fraction of the search space is discovered.
Using EVOC to answer the question what proportion of individuals should be ‘cre-
ative types’ given a certain innovation rate, we found that when creators innovate more
than 50% of the time, and imitators imitate 100% of the time, the ideal proportion
is 15% creators versus 85% imitators. If the creativity ratio for creators is lower than
50%, the ideal percentage of creators increases toward 100%.
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Figure 3.8: Effect of increasing percentage of creators in the population on mean fitness
of ideas after 50 iterations, for different degrees to which creators are creative. Error bars
indicate the standard deviation over 100 runs.
Figure 3.9: Effect of increasing percentage of creators in the population on diversity of
ideas after 50 iterations, for different degrees to which creators are creative. Error bars
indicate the standard deviation over 100 runs.
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3.3 Time Series Analysis
The overall fitness of a population is a complex function of at least two critical pa-
rameters: the share of population engaged in innovation and the rate at which creative
agents switch between innovation and imitation. The previous numerical simulations
suggest that if the share of innovators is low, optimal results are reached when they ded-
icate themselves fully to innovation. However, as the number of innovators increases,
the population is better off if innovators reduce their rate of novelty creation and spend
time imitating other’s ideas.
We investigated both the effect of varying how abundant creators are, and the effect
of varying how creative they are. The frequency of creators - that is, the proportion
of creators relative to imitators in the population - is referred to as C. The creativity
of creators - that is, the probability that a creator invents a new action instead of
imitating a neighbor - is referred to as p. It may help to think of the entire population
as being divided into three subgroups at any given iteration:
• C ∗ p ∗ 100 agents are creative agents attempting to innovate;
• C ∗ (1− p) ∗ 100 agents are creative but not attempting to innovate;
• (1− C) ∗ 100 agents always imitating.
It is also important to keep in mind that whereas the attributes creative and imitative
are permanent, the subgroups of creative agents either innovating or imitating at any
given time fluctuate stochastically. The process of innovation as driven by the neural
network explained in the previous chapter. If the attempt to innovate is abortive, the
agent retains it current configuration and fitness. If a creative agent does not attempt
to innovate (with a probability of 1 − p), it will behave as an imitator. The process
of imitation is analogous to “lazy (non-greedy) search.” The imitating agent will scan
its four neighbors in random order, adopt the first configuration with a fitness greater
than its own or, failing so, retain its current status.
3.3.1 Effects of Varying Creativity Rate and Proportion of Creators
on Diversity of Actions
Figure 3.10 illustrates the average diversity, or number of different actions in the ar-
tificial society, over the course of a run as a function of C and p. Action diversity is
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Figure 3.10: Average action diversity for different values of creator innovation probabil-
ity (p) and creator-to-imitator ratio (C), showing maximum (left) and minimum (right)
diversity.
positively correlated with both the percentage of creators, and their level of creativity.
As C and p increase, a larger fraction of the search space is discovered. This generally
holds true for both the maximum (peak) diversity as well as the minimal diversity
during a run.
As the reader will note by comparing the results above with our findings on fitness
(discussed below), high degrees of diversity are coupled with low overall fitness and vice
versa. This appears to be at odds with the great adaptive benefit of diversity generally
found in real-life evolutionary systems, be they of biological, cultural, economic or of
some other nature. The divergence between model and reality in this respect is due
to two interacting features of the model. First, whereas in real life, evolution unfolds
in an opportunity space which may be infinite, agents in EVOC are limited to a fairly
small number of potential configurations of which only a much smaller subset (8) are
optimal. Hence, high fitness demands that diversity be forsaken, and the sooner the
better. Second, imitation (in evolutionary systems of a social nature) and inheritance
in biology are predominantly recombinatorial - that is, they need not reduce diversity
and often function as the major source thereof. In contrast, imitation as presently
implemented in EVOC is the imitator acquiring all features of the sole other agent
selected for imitation - and thus effectively depletes diversity.
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3.3.2 Effects of Varying Creativity Rate and Proportion of Creators
on Fitness of Actions
For different values of C and p, the mean fitness of ideas over the course of a run
is measured. Given such a set of fitness series of accumulating value over time, it is
far from clear which series is the most desirable. The reason for this is, of course,
that the series cannot be unambiguously ordered unless for each pair of series one
strictly dominates the other. That is not the case for the results obtained with these
simulations. The curves representing mean population fitness at different values of
{C, p} all increase monotonically but they often cross and re-cross as time progresses.
What then is the optimal setting of {C, p}? This seemingly simple question will yield
no clear answer unless we employ some assessment of the effect of time on the valuation
of future benefits.
3.3.2.1 Time Series Discounting
The approach generally used to overcome this optimization problem is some form of
discounting which associates a “present value” with any future benefit in such a manner
that the present value of any given benefit diminishes as a function of the elapsed time
until the benefit is realized. The standard approach in financial settings is exponential
discounting. Given a series of benefits bt, the Net Present Value (NPV) for N periods
is defined as:
NPV (b) =
N∑
t=1
rt−1 bt with 0 < r ≤ 1 (3.1)
The discount rate r is normally set as r =
(
100+i
100
)−1
where i is the interest rate (in
percentage) for the unit period that an investor can obtain from a safe investment.
The basic idea of discounting may be used, albeit in a slightly altered form, to assess
the mean population fitness at different values. Two such methods are presented in
the next sections: Time-to-Threshold (TTT) discounting and Present Innovation Value
(PIV) discounting.
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Figure 3.11: 3D graph (left) and contour plot (right) showing the log10 Time-to-Threshold
(TTT) landscape of the average mean fitness for various values of C and p, with τ = 9;
the red line in the contour plot indicates the ridge.
3.3.2.2 Time-to-Threshold (TTT) Discounting
Since all fitness trajectories are monotonically increasing, those which reach a rea-
sonably high threshold sooner should be valued higher by the agents. We therefore
measure how many iterations (the time to threshold) it takes for fitness to reach τ .
Figure 3.11 shows the log10 values for different ratio and probability values in a 3D
graph and in a top-view contour plot for τ = 9. Note that by definition, a low TTT
value corresponds to high fitness.
Using the TTT method with this particular value for τ as a measure of optimal
fitness not only allows for realistic averaging over time, it also clearly demonstrates the
existence of a ridge in the landscape (indicated by a red line) which has been obtained
by visually extrapolating over the minimal values. Given any given C > 0.15 or any
given p > 0.35, the ridge determines which value of p or, respectively, C results in
optimal population fitness. The global optimum is at approximately {C, p} = {1,
0.35}. For values of C < 0.15, fitness is optimal at p = 1. For values of p < 0.35, fitness
is optimal at C = 1.
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3.3.2.3 Present Innovation Value (PIV) Discounting
We note that innovative agents can flourish on their own whereas imitators can only do
so in a society that attracts and retains innovative agents. In deciding whether or not to
join and remain in the EVOC community, an innovative agent would naturally consider
how well it could do on its own when fully engaged in experimentation (that is at p = 1)
and compare that to what levels of fitness it is likely to acquire in a community of agents
operating at some setting of {C, p}. Assuming that innovative agents fully subscribe
to the tenets of strict economic rationality (which is not something they have inherited
from their creators), they will desert if this comparison is negative and the society
disintegrates. This suggests that in the framework of EVOC the fitness prospects of
innovators working on their own is at least as important as the interest yield of treasury
bonds in investment decisions. This logic leads to a simple modification of the standard
discounting method for use in the context of EVOC.
Let FC,pt be the mean population fitness at period t for the parameter setting {C,
p}. Note that F 1,1t the fitness expectation of a solitary innovative agent because at this
setting there is effectively no social interaction between agents. We can then define the
Present Innovation Value (PIV), with N periods, for any fitness curve as:
PIV (FC,p) = −N +
N∑
t=1
FC,pt
F 1,1t
(3.2)
Naturally, we then have PIV (F 1,1) = 0, that is, the innovative agent is indifferent to
either working alone or in a ‘community’ where everybody is working on its own and
there is no social interaction in the form of imitation. Figure 3.12 shows the results
for PIV discounting. Note that in these visualizations, the z-axis of PIV values has
been reversed in order to obtain an unobstructed view into the surface. That is, lower
values are better. Based on the logic developed above, innovators will not desert except
when values of both C and p are very low. It is also clear that C = p = 1 is severely
suboptimal, but one must also point out that the surface is flat over a large domain.
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Figure 3.12: 3D graph (left) and contour plot (right) showing the Present Innovation
Value (PIV) landscape of the average mean fitness for various values of C and p; the red
line in the contour plot indicates the ridge.
3.3.3 Discussion
In this section, we report the results of an approach to this question that employed a
detailed and sophisticated analysis using Time-to-Threshold (TTT) and Present Inno-
vation Value (PIV). We found action diversity to be positively correlated with both the
percentage of creators, C, and their level of creativity, p. When both log10 TTT values
as well as PIV values for different ratio and probability settings were plotted in a 3D
graph and a top-view contour plot, this revealed a clear ridge in the fitness landscape,
indicating the optimal values of C and p.
The fundamental finding, in the simplest terms, is that imitation is neither just the
greatest compliment nor - less charitably put - a form of free-riding, but an indispensable
social mechanism that serves innovators and imitators alike. Without innovation, there
is nothing to imitate, but innovation loses most of its potential to create welfare unless
judiciously alloyed with imitation.
We note that the results obtained here reflect in part constraints in the current
architecture of the model. EVOC in its current implementation does not accommodate
combinatorial or selective imitation. An imitating agent copies all of the features of a
single reference agent; it does not copy selectively from several agents, nor can it retain
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some of its own features. Consequently, imitation destroys diversity. At the same time
imitation is essential to the rapid spread for superior configurations and steep increase
of fitness.
3.4 Creative Leadership
It is widely assumed that effective leaders are creative [5, 7, 130, 142, 149]. However, we
have seen that creativity can have drawbacks as well. The rationale is that in a group
of interacting individuals, only a fraction of them need to be creative for the benefits
of creativity to be felt throughout the group. The rest can reap the benefits of the
creator’s ideas by simply copying, using, or admiring them. After all, few of us know
how to build a computer, or write a symphony or novel, but they are nonetheless ours
to use and enjoy. Numerical simulations showed that if the proportion of creators is
low, the mean fitness of ideas in the artificial society is highest when creators dedicate
themselves fully to invention. However, as the proportion of creators increases, for
optimal results, creators should spend more time imitating. Creative agents amounted
to ‘puncture points’ in the fabric of society that interfered with the dissemination of
proven effective ideas.
In this section, we focus exclusively on the extent to which creativity is desirable
in a leader, where leadership is equated with having substantial influence over others.
Previous results indicated that the presence of a leader accelerates convergence on
optimal ideas, but does so at the cost of consistently reducing the diversity of ideas
[57, 58]. In these previous simulations, the leader was no more nor less creative than
the rest of the agents, referred to here as followers. The goal of the work reported
here was to investigate how creative versus uncreative leadership affects the group as
a whole.
The creative leadership experiments described below all make use of EVOC’s broad-
casting function. Broadcasting enables the action implemented by a leader to be visible
throughout the artificial society. While previous experiments investigated the impact
of varying the number of leaders on the fitness and diversity of ideas, in the experiments
reported here, all simulated societies consist of one leader and ninety-nine followers.
This leader is chosen once randomly and broadcasts throughout the entire run. In
previous experiments, agents choose the fittest action among those of their neighbors
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Figure 3.13: Mean fitness of actions with leaders of varying invention-to-imitation ratios,
and followers that only imitate, i.e. that never invent (e.g. i = 0.0). The legend indicates
the values of ileader.
when imitating. Here, the leader acts as a neighbor to all other agents, as its actions
are also taken into account during imitation.
3.4.1 Effect of Varying Inventiveness of Leaders and Followers on Fit-
ness of Ideas
The first experiment investigated the effect of varying the ratio of iterations spent
inventing versus imitating, or invention-to-imitation ratio, abbreviated i, of both the
leader and the followers, on the fitness of ideas produced by the artificial society. The
inventiveness of the leader, abbreviated ileader was systematically varied from 0.0 to
1.0. When ileader was 1.0, the leader invented a new action every iteration. When
ileader was 0.0, the leader never invented new actions; it only imitated its neighbors’
actions. It was still the leader because its actions were visible to, and could be imitated
by, all other agents in the society, not just its immediate neighbors, as was the case for
followers.
In the first set of runs, followers imitated each iteration and never invented, i.e.,
ifollower = 0.0. As shown in figure 3.13, with uncreative followers, the degree of creativ-
ity of the leader mattered a lot; the mean fitness of ideas across the artificial society
was positively correlated with the creativity of the leader.
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Figure 3.14: Mean fitness of actions with leaders of varying invention-to-imitation ratios,
and followers that invent as well as imitate (i = 0.05). The legend indicates the values of
ileader.
In the second set of runs, shown in figure 3.14, followers were able to invent. More
specifically, ifollower = 0.05; thus in each iteration, each of the 99 followers had a 5%
chance of inventing. Comparing figures 3.13 and 3.14 it is clear that while the degree
of creativity of the leader had a large impact when followers are uncreative, it had
almost no impact when followers were themselves creative. With creative followers, the
mean fitness of ideas generated by the society increased over the duration of a run at
more or less the same pace no matter how creative the leader was.
3.4.2 Effect of Varying Inventiveness of Leaders and Followers on Di-
versity of Ideas
The second part of this experiment involved investigating the effect of varying the
invention-to-imitation ratio i, of both the leader and the followers on the diversity of
ideas produced by the artificial society. As in the previous experiment, ileader was
systematically varied from 0.0 to 1.0. The result obtained with ifollower = 0.0 is shown
in figure 3.15.
In the short run, creative leadership was associated with increased diversity of ac-
tions. However, in the long run, no matter how creative the leader, all agents converged
on the same action, despite that there were seven other equally optimal actions they
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Figure 3.15: Diversity of actions in the artificial society with leaders of varying invention-
to-imitation ratios, and followers that only imitate (i = 0.0). The legend indicates the
values of ileader.
could have converged upon. Results with higher values of ifollower (not shown) were
qualitatively similar. Action diversity was initially substantially higher, but it still
always eventually converged to 1.
3.4.3 Effect of Varying Leaders’ Rate of Conceptual Change
There are two ways an agent’s creativity can be manipulated in EVOC. The first way
involves changing i, the invention-to-imitation ratio, as in the first set of experiments.
It is possible to vary not just how frequently an agent invents, but how creative its
newly invented ideas are. This second measure, referred to as the rate of conceptual
change, abbreviated c, is implemented as follows. Invention occurs by taking the current
action, and modifying it. When c is low, the newly invented action varies little from
the previous action upon which it was based. When c is high, the newly invented idea
varies dramatically from the previous idea upon which it was based.
As mentioned previously, the default value of c, the probability of change to any
body part during invention, is 1/6 for any agent that invents, whether it is a leader or
a follower. Previous experiments revealed this to be the rate that optimizes the rate
of increase in mean fitness of actions [53]. Since ideas are ideas for actions, and since
actions involve at most six body parts, on average, each newly invented action involves
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Figure 3.16: Mean fitness of actions in the artificial society with leaders of varying rates
of conceptual change, and followers that only imitate. The legend indicates the values of
cleader.
a change to the motion of one body part. Thus c = 1/6 means that each body part
changes what it is doing with a 1/6 probability, or 17% of the time. In this second
set of experiments, shown in figure 3.16, cleader was systematically varied from 0% to
100%. Since the followers only imitated, cfollower = 0. Because that means there are
no new actions for the leader to imitate, ileader was set to 1.0.
Unlike the experiments reported previously, the optimal degree of creative leader-
ship with respect to this second measure of creativity depends on what phase of the
creative process the society was at. Early on in a run, a form of leadership that entails
the highest possible rate of conceptual change (100%) was most beneficial. However,
as the run progressed a transition occurred, after which point a much lower rate of
conceptual change (approximately 40%) was most beneficial.
3.4.4 Discussion
The experiments reported in this section investigated the impact of creative versus
uncreative leadership on the mean fitness and diversity of ideas for actions in an
agent-based artificial society. The first experiment looked at the effect of varying the
invention-to-imitation ratio of both leader and followers. The mean fitness of actions
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was positively correlated with the creativity of the leader, but only when the followers
were uncreative. The more creative the followers, the greater the extent to which the
beneficial effect of creative leadership was washed out. Although one must be cautious
about extrapolating from a simple simulation such as this to the real world, the result
suggests that creativity may be a relatively unimportant quality for a manager of a
creative team, but an important quality for a manager of an uncreative team.
In the first experiment, we also investigated the effect of varying the invention-
to-imitation ratio of both leader and followers on the diversity or number of different
actions implemented by agents in the artificial society. Previous results with EVOC
had suggested that the beneficial effect of leadership on mean fitness of ideas is tem-
pered by decreased diversity of ideas, and this echoed previous simulation findings that
leadership can have adverse effects when agents can communicate [66]. We wanted to
know whether the decreased diversity associated with the presence of a leader was still
observed when leaders are highly creative or highly uncreative compared to followers.
We found that while in the early stages of a run, creative leadership (as well as the
degree of creativity of followers) was associated with higher diversity, eventually all
agents converged on what the leader was doing no matter how creative the leader (or
how creative the followers). This suggests that in the long run leadership diminishes
cultural diversity regardless of how creative the leader is. It is worth noting, however,
that in this artificial world, unlike the real world, agents had only one task to accom-
plish; further research is required to investigate whether these results hold true when
the fitness function varies over time.
The second set of experiments investigated the effect of not how often the leader
invents, but how original any particular invention is, referred to as the rate of conceptual
change. We found that early on in the creative process, when the fitness of the ideas
that are getting generated was still relatively low, it was best if the leader was very
creative (high rate of conceptual change). However, later in the creative process, once
relatively fit ideas were being generated, a less creative leader was better (low rate of
conceptual change). This result may reflect that the fitness function used here exhibits
‘cultural epistasis’. Initially, the higher the rate of conceptual change, the more quickly
fitter actions are found. However, once relatively fit actions have been found, a high
rate of conceptual change breaks up co-adapted epistatically linked elements and thus
interferes with convergence toward optimal actions. We suspect that many real-world
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problem solving situations involve this kind of epistasis. Thus, although once again
one must be cautious about extrapolating from the results of simple simulations such
as this to the real world, our results suggest that a new startup company benefits most
from highly creative leadership, while a more established company, or one that has
stabilized on an established product line, benefits most from a more conservative form
of leadership.
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4CREATING SYMBOLS
This chapter1 explores the difference between indexical and symbolic interpretation
using a neural network simulation of a series of language training experiments with
chimpanzees. The results of this simulation lead to a discussion about the systemic
requirements for crossing the symbolic threshold and how the primacy of icons applies to
computational models. Whereas modeling tasks that require iconic interpretation (such
as pattern recognition and classification) are well-understood in the computational
domain, modeling indexical and particularly symbolic interpretation seems to require a
hierarchical system dynamics that doesn’t readily fit within the existing computational
and neural network paradigms.
4.1 The Meanings of Symbol
In a study aiming to test the linguistic abilities of chimpanzees, several experiments
are devised and conducted to demonstrate how different learning strategies produce
different uses of language [137]. The study shows how their learning curves can be
understood from the way these chimps acquire language, allowing for a behavioral
operationalization of language acquisition. The results are embedded within a larger
semiotic theory of symbolic interpretation, distinguishing between three types of signs
1This chapter appeared as [104] Leijnen, S. (2012). Emerging symbols. In T. Schilhab, F. Stjernfeld
and T. Deacon (Eds.) The Symbolic Species Evolved. Springer Biosemiotics Series, 6:253–262.
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(icons, indices and symbols) that describe how an object can be related to a referent
by an interpreter [20, 23, 83].
Several other language training studies [62, 128, 136] show that apes can acquire
large vocabularies. The subject has to point to one or more lexigrams on a board in or-
der to express its thoughts or desires. Researchers stimulate the apes to use the correct
lexigrams and apply appropriate grammar rules. However, even though their sentence
construction capability can be trained to be more or less flawless, their learning strategy
appears to differ from the way humans would approach such a problem. Although they
appear to use lexigrams as representations of the objects they stand for (like humans
do) their pointing behavior is a trained response to the presented stimulus.
The often implicit assumption that these apes use lexigrams as representations for
something else is not to be easily overlooked. For us to talk about apes using language
and having a vocabulary, evidence is required that - indeed - these apes use linguistic
skills to solve a problem, instead of associative skills to merely discover a correlation
between stimuli and responses leading to a reward. The difference between these two
skills is subtle but crucial, especially considering the principal reason for doing ape
language studies is finding out if they are actually capable of learning a language.
So how are we to make this distinction clear? We find two contrasting definitions
of symbols in which the difference is expressed [36]:
S1 a symbol is one of a conventional set of tokens manipulated with respect to certain
of its physical characteristics by a set of substitution, elimination, and combination
rules, and which is arbitrarily correlated with some referent;
S2 a symbol is one of a conventional set of tokens that marks a node in a complex
web of interdependent referential relationships and specific reference is not obvi-
ously discernible from its token features. Its reference is often obscure, abstract,
multifaceted, and cryptic, and tends to require considerable experience or training
to interpret.
The chimpanzees in the Savage-Rumbaugh & Rumbaugh study [137] are subjected to
a training program that causes the disparity between these two kinds of symbols to
become salient, demonstrated by a significant difference in performance results. In one
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experiment, the chimps learn to distinguish lexigrams for four objects (banana, orange,
coke and milk) and two verbs (give and pour). The chimpanzees are required to use
the correct verb with each noun by arranging them in a sentence. Producing accurate
sentences like give orange or pour milk is rewarded; producing incorrect compounds
like pour banana or coke milk is discouraged.
Once the chimps have learned to associate pairs correctly, a follow-up experiment
shows that their symbol use is, in fact, non-symbolic. As the researchers introduce
new edibles and liquids to the experiment, the amount of trials needed to learn to
embed these words into sentences grows. Instead of using the web of relations to which
the lexigrams refer - the chimps know that edibles are given and liquids are poured,
but they don’t apply this knowledge to the construction of lexigram sentences – they
memorize each verb-noun correlation as a rule. The chimps use lexigrams as
“[. . . ] a set of events which come to precede the receipt of a desired action
or object. [. . . ] errorless trials, though given in a fashion which closely
approximates that of the final choice, do not lead to symbolic learning even
in simple tasks such as food names [137].”
The apes have learned to use symbols as defined by S1, but not according to the more
strict definition S2. The relations between the lexigrams are arbitrary, as the chimps
fail to notice the analogy with the relations between objects and actions. S1 is a rather
shallow, computational definition of symbols that doesn’t capture the way humans use
symbols as expressed in S2. Hence, phrased in semiotic terms, the chimpanzees have
learned to use lexigrams as indices. An index pairs two things together based on their
co-appearance, like a thermometer (number and temperature) or a windsock (position
and wind direction). In this case, a noun lexigram is paired with a verb lexigram.
For the ape subjects to use the lexigrams as symbols (according to S2) a reference
is required to the network of relations for which the lexigrams stand. Evoking such
a reference is exactly the goal of the next experiment in the chimp language training
program. It is set up in almost the same way as in the previous ones, but this time
the apes’ attention is drawn toward the food and drink dispensers by increasing their
saliency with visual and auditory signals. The apes now notice the dispensers opening,
also when they’re empty. This causes some of the apes to pair their understanding
of objects and actions with their understanding of lexigrams, and transfer knowledge
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between these networks. Instead of memorizing each and every lexigram combination as
an index, these chimps have created a symbolic link, which offers them a more efficient
way of storing information in the long run.
4.2 Simulated Learning
The chimp language training research supports the claim that symbolism is not intrinsic
to a word, lexigram or object, but is dependent on the interpretation itself. Interpreters
can be iconic, indexical and symbolic. Some of the apes were capable of all three of
these skills, while others could only reach the indexical level. In order to explain this
gap, it would be insightful to see inside a chimp’s head, study how signals travel between
neurons and how eventually a lexigram sentence comes about. In a meticulous study of
the chimp’s interpretation process, the differences that cause the symbolic shift could
be unveiled. Of course, the sheer complexity and size of the brain would result in far
too many parameters for us to make sense of. As an alternative, computer simulated
models of smaller, less complex brains can be used in order to discover the systemic
requirements for symbolic interpretation.
For our experiments, we will use an artificial neural network: a three-layer percep-
tron [13] with full connectivity (figure 4.1). The nodes in the hidden and output layer
are implemented with a step activation threshold function:
αi =
n∑
i=1
wi xi ,
yj =
{
1 for αi ≥ θ
0 for αi < θ
,
where αi is the total activation of unit i, yj the base value for output connection j, xi
the base value for input connection i, wi the weight of input connection i, n the number
of input connections and θ the threshold parameter (0.85).
By varying the connection weights between neurons, different network architectures
are generated, each with a potentially different behavior (i.e. returning a specific out-
put in response to a certain input). After a set of random weight configurations has
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   Figure 4.1: Three-layer perceptron will full-connectivity
been selected, each of their input layers is activated with trial data and propagated as
an activation wave through the network. Weight configurations are stored in a binary
array. A score is awarded to each network based on the percentage of desired output
values in a series of training sessions. The highest scoring networks are then subjected
to crossover - randomly combining the binary arrays of two successfull networks - and
mutation - randomly flipping some bits of the binary arrays formed by crossover - to
form a new generation of network configurations, and so on. Due to the similarity with
biological evolution and the storage of information in gene-like data arrays, this method
is formally known as a genetic algorithm [82]. The parameters of this particular GA
are given in table 4.1.
Parameter Value
children per generation 50
elites per generation 10
maximum generations 30000
learning runs 100
Pmutation per bit 0.01
Table 4.1: Genetic algorithm settings.
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4.3 Experiments
Using the computational tools described above, the difference between indexical and
symbolic interpretation is shown in a series of experiments. The two types of chimps
(symbolic and non-symbolic) of the original language training research are modeled as
neural networks. Objects, actions and lexigrams are replaced by binary strings of input
and output data. The genetic algorithm acts as a training program, forwarding input
data into the networks and evaluating the results.
For the indexical learning model, the objects, actions and lexigrams are coded ac-
cording to the method displayed in table 4.2. There are a couple of things that should
be noted about this encoding. First, it disregards iconic interpretation processes by
translating multifaceted entities into easily discernable icons. The chimpanzees are re-
quired to make distinctions between bananas, yellow lexigrams, cans of coke and acts of
pouring, but the neural network simply uses a ten bit binary string as input and output
of the indexical process. This ensures that the neural network learns to create indexical
associations, instead of a mixture of icons and indices: marginalizing the role of iconic
interpretation isolates the indexical interpretation process which facilitates the study
of its features. Also, in order to allow for a fair comparison with the symbolic network
(the number of activated input neurons may influence the learning rate, and therefore
needs to remain constant in each experiment) a bias unit is added to the input vector.
Network input Binary string Correct output Binary string
banana + bias 1000000001 banana lexigram + give lexigram 1000000010
coke + bias 0100000001 coke lexigram + pour lexigram 0100000001
orange + bias 0010000001 orange lexigram + give lexigram 0010000010
Table 4.2: Binary encoding examples for the indexical experiment.
The neural network is trained by the genetic algorithm to output the correct binary
string, given a certain input string. For the input string, the leading eight bits indicate
the presence of a particular edible or liquid, the ninth bit is always zero and the tenth
bit is always one. The output string uses the leading eight bits to signify the use of
a food or drink lexigram. The trailing two bits denote the use of an action lexigram.
Once the first pairing has been learned (i.e. banana with give banana), a second pair
58
4.3 Experiments
	  
Figure 4.2: Learning curves for the indexical task (a), the symbolic task (b) and the
domain task (c). The y-axis indicates the number of generations it takes for each additional
object (x-axis) to be learned.
is added to the dataset. The learning continues with the same network and a training
set of two possible input strings. This process is repeated until all eight objects have
been associated with correct output sentences. The time it takes the network to learn
each additional object is displayed in figure 4.2a. Notice that, for each task, learning
the second object takes a considerable amount of time: after the network is trained to
recognize one object exclusively, it takes time to learn that multiple objects need to
be recognized. Adding a third requires less time learning, as the network is already
trained to recognize multiple objects.
The chimps that learn to manipulate lexigrams as symbols are induced to adopt a
new learning strategy by the food and drink dispensers. These dispensers make them
reconsider the relation between the lexigram buttons and obtaining a reward. They
notice a systemic similarity between the system of lexigrams and the system of objects
and actions [34] and use their existing knowledge of the object domain to produce
correct lexigram sentences.
For the symbolic learning model, we use the same approach as for the indexical
simulation, with the exception of the domain knowledge being available in the input
string. In other words, the subject already knows that a banana is given (not poured)
and takes this knowledge into account when it constructs a sentence. The additional
information helps to predict the correct outcome, as actions and action lexigrams are
correlated. The training data is shown in table 4.3, the resulting learning curve in
figure 4.2b.
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Network input Binary string Correct output Binary string
banana + give 1000000010 banana lexigram + give lexigram 1000000010
coke + pour 0100000001 coke lexigram + pour lexigram 0100000001
orange + give 0010000010 orange lexigram + give lexigram 0010000010
Table 4.3: Binary encoding examples for the symbolic experiment.
A comparison between the learning curves of the indexical and symbolic models is
somewhat biased. Just as the chimpanzees were at some point required to learn that
bananas are given and milk is poured, so should the symbolic network, one could argue.
The goal of these experiments is to test the difference between indexical and symbolic
learning; to exclude learning the domain knowledge would be a bias. Therefore, we
carried out a third experiment. A neural network learns to associate objects with cor-
responding actions, using the same method as in the previous experiments. Table 4.4
contains the training data, the resulting learning curve is displayed in figure 4.2c.
Network input Binary string Correct output Binary string
banana + bias 1000000001 give + bias 1000000001
coke + bias 0100000001 pour + bias 0100000001
orange + bias 0010000001 give + bias 0010000001
Table 4.4: Binary encoding examples for the domain experiment.
4.4 Conclusions
A neural network model is used to simulate two different learning strategies in a series
of three experiments. A genetic algorithm operates on a population of networks to
train them in producing the desired output string. To generate a training dataset with
input and output patterns, eight objects, two actions and ten lexigrams that were also
used in the chimpanzee trainings tasks are encoded into binary patterns. For each of
the experiments, this results in a learning curve, showing the average number of gener-
ations needed by the genetic algorithm to find a working network configuration when a
new object is inserted into the training dataset. The first experiment (indexical task)
simulates how much learning time is required to map objects to lexigram sentences. In
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Figure 4.3: Learning curves for all three tasks compared. The y-axis indicates the number
of generations it takes for each additional object (x-axis) to be learned.
the second experiment (symbolic task) both the object and the action are part of the
input. Finally, a third experiment (domain task) is added to avoid a possible bias. In
comparing the indexical and symbolic task, the learning time required for the domain
knowledge task is added to the learning time for the symbolic task. This gives four
learning curves, as shown in figure 4.3.
Several conclusions can be drawn from these curves. The domain knowledge task
takes considerably less time than the other tasks, which can be attributed to the re-
quired output containing only one variable (either give or pour) instead of two. Also,
there is an overall decrease in learning time after the third object is added. Once the
two possible output patterns have been learned, the network has created a tendency to
produce the right kinds of output patterns in the future. This holds for the indexical
and symbolic tasks as well as for the domain task; however, due to the steep learning
curves of the former two, this effect is not as significant.
The chimpanzee experiment claims that the apes that adopted a symbolic approach
required more training time and made more errors during training, but once they had
crossed the symbolic threshold, they were able to produce better sentences and learn
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new symbols faster. Figure 4.3 shows that this also holds for the simulated interpreters.
Requiring less time to learn the first objects, the indexical learning curve grows steeper
than the symbolic learning curve in the long run.
4.5 Discussion
We have set up the neural network experiments in order to investigate the differences
between indexical and symbolic learning. Although such a difference can be shown
to exist in our models, the experimental findings do not prove the accuracy of the
models used nor do they validate the conversion from the chimpanzee language train-
ing program to the simulation. It should be noted that too many simplifications and
assumptions had to be made to call these networks either indexical or symbolic in-
terpreters. In order to reduce the complexity and tractability of the learning task, a
relatively straightforward neural network is used. Also, even though a bias is avoided
by adding the domain task, it is unclear how exactly the learning curve of the domain
task and the symbolic curve ought to compare to the results of the indexical task. One
should therefore be prudent with generalizing the particular model and approach used
in these experiments.
However, when the results are projected onto the semiotic theory they allow for
interesting conclusions to be drawn. The learning curves may help identify the mecha-
nisms that underlie the shift to symbolism. The findings show that this shift may serve
a practical purpose as it allows the subject to oﬄoad memory from one domain to
another, thereby avoiding duplication of information. With selection pressure favoring
language use, this could give an advantage to symbolic over non-symbolic systems. The
findings also indicate that for a symbolic shift to take place in this model, the different
domains (e.g. the domain of objects and actions and the domain of lexigram relations)
are required to be mapped onto each other by the interpreter. Understanding how this
mapping takes place is an important step toward a more accurate simulation of the
interpretation process and the role of symbols herein.
Recall our two definitions of symbols, S1 and S2. In the case of S1, a lexigram would
point directly to a referent (i.e. an index). According to the second definition S2, the
symbol would also have a pointing relation to its referent, albeit a more obscure one
which is embedded in a web of interdependent referential relationships. In the chimp
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experiments, the relations that exist among objects and lexigrams are also embedded in
a web that spans both the lexigram domain and the object-action domain. A lexigram
can be an index for another lexigram: their simultaneous use will likely lead to a
pointing relationship from one to another (banana lexigram is usually followed by give
lexigram, hardly ever by pour lexigram). The realm of objects and actions has a similar
system of pointing relations (coke is always poured and never given). Therefore, a
symbolic relation is, as one might say, a higher-order pointing relation from one domain
to another. For the interpreter to create this kind of relation, it needs to find domains
that can be mapped onto one another. Not every pairing of indexical systems is viable,
there has to be a correlation between them that makes linking them purposeful. The
input data presented in the symbolic task has some redundancy in it, so it makes sense
for the interpreter to correlate the system of lexigrams with the system of actions and
objects (table 4.3). It is exactly this redundancy or system iconicity (redundancy
implies a lack of difference) in the topology of the systems that makes a symbolic
relation advantageous [34]. A symbol, therefore, is a triadic relation that requires
two systems of indices with topological redundancy, resulting in a higher-order index
between two loci in those systems. The recognition of this redundancy, the insight that
two domains are alike, is prerequisite for the symbolic shift to occur in an individual.
We can take this deconstruction of the sign one step further and consider what
an index, being the constituent of symbols, is itself composed of. A pointing relation
always points from one thing A to another B, which may in turn point to a third C
and so on. The index from A to B is activated by the recognition of A (which is an
iconic process). By virtue of their indexical relationship, A causes B to become active
(as though B has been recognized). Suppose for example that A is smoke and B is a
fire. The thought of a fire may cause a new thought C, no matter whether the fire was
perceived directly (icon) or thought of after perceiving smoke (index). Consequently,
what is caused by an index is also an icon.
The pointing relation itself is caused by a recurring appearance of signal and refer-
ent, being in close proximity to each other in one or more dimensions (i.e. spatial or
temporal). Recognizing B frequently after recognizing A causes the interpreter to make
a prediction about the future occurrences of B after A. The commonality of these sit-
uations is the simultaneous occurrence of signal and referent. Once the signal appears
again, the interpreter recognizes the state as one of those situations where both signal
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and referent occur together. This recognition is itself a higher-order icon, because it
classifies the signal-referent relation as one of many that have occurred before. Hence,
an index is a relation between two icons that exists by virtue of a higher-order icon:
their regular co-occurrence.
As an index is solely composed of icons, and a symbol is a particular configuration
of indices, it follows that icons are the primary building blocks for all three types of
interpretation. This conclusion does not imply that every iconic interpreter is also an
indexical or symbolic interpreter. As the ape language training tasks as well as the
simulation experiments show, a specific configuration is required for symbolic interpre-
tation. Some apes were clearly unable to do symbolic interpretation even though they
had indexical capacities. The neural networks that were trained to learn indices clearly
show a behavior that differs from symbolic networks. Likewise, indexical interpretation
requires a specific setup of iconic skills in order to induce the formation of a higher-order
icon.
This conclusion would imply that iconic interpretation is a fundamental skill for
interpretation. The firstness of icons is argued for in semiotics [124] but also by the pro-
ficiency of simple neural network models in classification tasks, where their robustness
allows them to deal with distorted data [75, 97]. The potential of these computational
models for recognition and classification tasks makes them a good starting point for
further investigations into indexical and symbolic models of interpretation.
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5COMPUTATION, CREATIVITY AND
CONSTRAINT
This short chapter1 describes why a system needs to be capable of producing its own
constraints in order to be self-programming. This contrasts with the idea that what
computer programs produce is already, implicitly, present in their initial set of instruc-
tions. A capacity for transformational creativity turns out to be a crucial factor for
systems to be considered self-programming.
5.1 Introduction
What causes a program’s execution? Is it the design of the program, or the system
on which it runs? In order for a program to execute as intended many times over,
a stable environment is required in which instructions are flawlessly converted into
physical operations. Computers take care of exactly that: they have been meticulously
designed to maintain stability against noise and interaction, except for the operations
of the program they provide an environment for. Systems have a natural tendency
to degrade and fall apart; computers serve to constrain the physical surroundings of
1This chapter is based on [103] Leijnen, S. (2011). Thinking Outside the Box: Creativity in Self-
Programming Systems. Self-Programming in AGI Systems Workshop, August 4, 2011, Mountain View,
CA.
65
5. COMPUTATION, CREATIVITY AND CONSTRAINT
a program. They are the embodiment of a perfect unnatural mechanism, not only
faster and more precise than the human mind, but also of a kind of dullness that we
humans aren’t capable of sustaining for a long period of time [16]. A program, then,
is a set of ordered instructions that further constrains the executions that are possible
on a computer. In order to guarantee that the execution goes as intended by the
programmer, the program should be in a maximally constrained state, that is, it forces
the computer to follow a single execution trajectory while making all other trajectories
(e.g. those classified as logical errors, bugs or hardware failures) extremely unlikely to
occur.
If programs are essentially ordered sets of instructions, then for a system to be
self-programming it has to be capable of producing its own instructions. That is, new
constraints that affect its operation. However, as a program is generally designed to
be maximally constrained system, these changes are necessarily already part of the
original program. A paradox resides in the theoretical concept of a self-programming
algorithm: either the new constraint is already present in the program, and therefore
not new, or it is created by the program itself - in which case it is not a constraint since
the system could not be constrained any further. One way out of this paradox deals
with creating programs that are not maximally constrained.
5.2 Combination, Exploration and Transformation
The ways in which constraint can be removed corresponds to the kind of creativity in-
volved in the process. When dealing with computational creativity, a distinction is often
made between combinatorial, exploratory and transformational creativity [15]. Com-
binatorial creativity is the discovery of a statistically unusual occurrence; exploratory
creativity is the discovery of a new idea that had been a possibility all along; and
transformational creativity deals with finding ideas that had previously been thought
impossible.
We argue that combinatorial and exploratory creativity can be modeled fairly well
with a maximally constrained computer program. For example, when a program
searches for an optimal solution by traversing a designed search space along a designed
or randomly generated path, it can be said to be capable of discovering statistically
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Figure 5.1: Schematic illustration of constraints affecting the execution of a program.
Maximized constraint (left) and lowered constraint (right).
unusual occurrences, as well as discovering new ideas - albeit capable of finding only
those allowed for by the search space.
Transformational creativity, however, cannot be modeled computationally in a straight-
forward way, as traversing a designed search space does not qualify as inventing some-
thing radically new. Ultimately, this search space is determined by a human program-
mer. The next section argues that, even if a program transforms the search space, this
new space is implicitly present in the original program and therefore does not contain
‘radically new’ ideas.
5.3 Self-Programming Constraint
By definition, a maximally constrained program explores a single trajectory (figure 5.1,
left). That is, the constraints of the search space are implicit in the constraints of the
program. No constraints can exist that are not already implicitly present within the
original constraints of the program; therefore, such a program cannot be considered
exhibit transformational creativity or self-programming. This agrees with the notion
that for transformational creativity to occur, partial independence from intentional
control is a prerequisite [99].
Conversely, if a program is less-than-maximally constrained (i.e. due to causes that
interfere with a program’s execution), it would leave room for creating new constraints.
Examples of these causes include programming errors, deviations in the physical em-
bodiment, interaction by users or other programs, or (pseudo-)random functions. Such
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factors have in common that they can be noisy and unpredictable, features which can
be employed to lower the amount of constraint on a program’s execution. Consequently,
instead of a constricted path there now exists a space of possibilities in which multi-
ple paths are available, depending on the cause of interference and how it affects the
program (figure 5.1, right).
Such a deconstrained space allows for the system to self-program new constraints.
New, because the resulting path is not completely determined by the algorithm, but
also by how the space is transformed by the interplay between program and the decon-
straining interference. What appears to be noise disturbing the computational process,
actually provides a breakdown of constraint that is necessary for transformational cre-
ativity and self-programming to occur [37].
5.4 Conclusions
A maximally constrained program uses exploratory creativity to change its state. For a
system to be considered as self-programming, it needs to be capable of transformational
creativity, which in turn requires a lessening of constraint in order for new constraint
to come about. This is established by allowing for deviations from the maximally
constrained path that the algorithm might follow, which are henceforth not part of the
program itself.
In the end, merely allowing for random changes to the search space of a program
is not a sufficient condition for qualifying it as self-programming; the search space
also needs to change in a meaningful way. Creativity, contrary to random exploration,
requires purpose [76]. So while bugs, errors and random numbers provide a means to
get out of a designed search space, they do not specify where to get to, or how to
get there. Another worthwhile observation is that the reduction of constraint causes
a system’s operations to become less well-defined. This makes the system lose some
of the qualities that we tend to attribute to a computer program [96]. As a system
becomes more self-programming, it becomes less of a program itself.
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6CONSTRAINT,
SELF-ORGANIZATION AND
AUTOGENESIS
The findings reported in the two previous chapters have launched an investigation
into the nature of constraint. Origin of life theories often argue that molecular self-
organization explains the spontaneous emergence of structural and dynamical con-
straints. However, the preservation of these constraints over time is not well-explained
because of the self-undermining and self-limiting nature of these same processes. A
process called autogenesis has been proposed in which a synergetic coupling between
self-organized processes preserves the constraints thereby accumulated. This chapter1
presents a computer simulation of this process (the Autogenic Automaton) and com-
pares its behavior to the same self-organizing processes when uncoupled. We demon-
strate that this coupling produces a second order constraint that can both resist dissi-
pation and become replicated in new substrates over time.
1This chapter was submitted to Artificial Life Journal as [109] Leijnen, S., Heskes, T. and Deacon,
T. W. (under review) Exploring Constraint: Simulating Self-Organization and Autogenesis in the
Autogenic Automaton.
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6.1 Introduction
How could life have emerged? Although understanding life’s origins does not necessarily
imply understanding life as we find it around us today [25], it promises far reaching
consequences for scientific fields such as cognitive science [156] and artificial intelligence
[102] as the emergent dynamics that created life may have also shaped mind, machine
and society.
Theories explaining the possible origins of life are as numerous as the properties that
are claimed to define it. Some define life based on a general capacity for replication
[163] or the exchange of energy and matter with an external environment [113, 133].
Others characterize life as systems using template-based encoding (e.g. RNA) [90] or
being composed of autocatalytic sets [125]. Although each of these theories has its
own flavor in explaining life’s possible origins [93], many assume the involvement of the
structure forming dynamics of self-organization.
Despite their often pivotal role in explaining the emergence of life, self-organizing
processes are limited in their capacity to maintain structure [129]. A recently proposed
theory suggests that, beyond mere self-organization, a synergetic coupling between self-
organizing processes is a minimal requirement for life [39]. Through this higher-order
linkage, the processes that generate structure may persistently recreate a capacity for
self-creation, leading to robustness and a potential capacity for long-term sustenance
and natural selection. As an example of such an autogenic process, a proto-life model
system called the autogen is described to illustrate how two self-organizing processes –
reciprocal catalysis and self-assembly – maintain each other’s boundary conditions and
thereby mutually increase the probability of persistence over time [38].
Currently, the autogen model is a theoretical proposition that remains to be val-
idated experimentally. As a step toward validation, this chapter describes a series of
simulation experiments that investigate the self-organizing and autogenic properties
of the autogen model. A simplified particle system simulation called the Autogenic
Automaton models the synergetic linkage of self-organizing processes that leads to the
emergence of autogens. In the next section, this higher-order linkage is described in
more detail, followed by a description of the computational model and the methods
used to simulate and quantify the self-organizing and autogenic processes that gener-
ate, eliminate, and preserve constraint.
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6.2 Autogenesis
Life’s ability to resist degradation and persist in hostile environments is both ubiquitous
and astonishing. Generation of structure, preservation by repair, and trait persistence
through reproduction are perpetually organized in a continuous struggle against the
destabilizing mechanisms of the second law of thermodynamics. In this section, auto-
genesis is introduced in three parts: first, how the inevitable increase of thermodynamic
entropy poses a problem for models of life based on self-organization. Then autogenesis
is presented as a three-tiered process hierarchy of constraint elimination, constraint gen-
eration and constraint preservation (and ensuing constraint selection), after which this
hierarchy is exemplified by the autogen model, to be used for the subsequent simulation
experiments.
6.2.1 Second-Order Self-Organization
Self-organization may occur in open systems that are continually perturbed toward a
far-from-equilibrium state through incessant nonlinear amplification of local fluctua-
tions [129]. These systems tend to reduce their statistical entropy, i.e. their variety
of potential states, thereby becoming statistically less complex; for this reason, self-
organization may also be regarded as self-simplification [4].
A typical example is the formation of Rayleigh–Be´nard convection cells [64], which
may emerge if a fluid is heated from below, causing fast-moving molecules in the bot-
tom to rise upward while slow molecules simultaneously move downwards. These two
vertical motions lead to horizontal heat exchange between upward and downward mov-
ing molecules, obstructing the dissipation of heat from its source to the surface. Under
certain conditions (e.g. temperature, viscosity, shape and size of the surface) hexagonal
convection cells develop that minimize the horizontal heat exchange and thereby max-
imize vertical heat dissipation. As the number of potential system states is reduced by
the emergence of these cells, the system becomes more ordered. Other examples include
laser beams [73], where optical amplification results in spatial coherence; vortices, such
as whirlpools and tornadoes; and autocatalytic chemical reactions, where the product
of a reaction is also a catalyst for it, leading to a nonlinear reaction increase under
particular proximity conditions [161].
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The nonlinear amplification that is typical for self-organization tends to push the ther-
modynamic conditions for further propagation toward the unfavorable. This may occur
up to a point where the system is no longer far-from-equilibrium and the local thermo-
dynamic entropy increase comes to a halt. For example, in a reciprocally catalytic set,
reaction rates may increase exponentially as more and more catalysts are produced, up
until the point when not enough reactants are available for further propagation, and the
self-organizing process ends. Given the universal presence of self-organization in living
systems, how can it be possible that order persists long enough for complex organisms
to come about? It has been suggested that the answer may lie in the hierarchical
organization of self-organizing processes [39].
When the product of an autocatalytic reaction enables a second autocatalytic re-
action, which produces a reactant that enables the first (or a third, etc., as long as the
causal chain is eventually closed), a so-called hypercycle emerges [46]. Hypercycles rep-
resent one possible way in which self-organizing processes, autocatalytic cycles in this
case, may be linked together in a dynamical process hierarchy. However, with respect to
preventing self-undermining, this particular type of second-order self-organization does
not provide a sufficient solution: each autocatalytic cycle that the hypercycle consists
of represents a potential weakest link, which may cause the fragile hypercycle to break
down entirely when reactants or energy for this particular cycle are no longer available.
Autogenesis requires another type of second-order self-organization where two (or
more) self-organizing processes not only promote each other, but also where they act as
a supportive environment if one of them breaks down, such that their self-undermining
tendencies are reciprocally counteracted.
6.2.2 Constraint
The formation of crystals through self-assembly is a self-organizing process. The prob-
ability of particle detachment decreases with the number of adjacent crystal cells that
keep a particle in place, further limiting diffusion of these particles and thereby re-
ducing the uniformity of their spatial distribution (i.e. at some locations there are
many particles present while at other locations there are few particles to none). The
attachment and detachment rates of the assembly process, together with the particular
binding properties of the particles that make up these crystals, generate a constraint
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on the spatial distribution of particles. More generally, a reduction of the variety of
macroscopic states can be understood as a constraint producing process [37].
From a constraint-centric perspective, the global increase of entropy predicted by the
second law of thermodynamics appears to run counter to the production of constraint
caused by self-organization. Thermodynamic entropy increase spontaneously intro-
duces noise into the system, as the probability of a random microscopic event inducing
more order is lower than the probability of an event inducing less order (there are rel-
atively few ordered states), thereby increasing the variety of macroscopic states. An
example of such a constraint eliminating is the noise inducing process of an ice cube
melting in a soda drink: considering the possible states of water molecules in the glass,
the number of states where only some of the molecules are arranged in a solid ice-cube
is by far outnumbered by the number of states where they are all mixed up.
Living systems tend to produce constraint as well as preserve it against elimination.
This capacity allows organisms, and lineages of organisms, to persist over long stretches
of time. Following the type of second-order self-organization described above as auto-
genesis, constraint preservation is enabled by a juxtaposition of constraint producing
processes, such that they actively support each other’s persistence [35]. Whereas self-
promoting self-organizing processes (e.g. hypercycles) tend toward self-undermining
and ultimately a breakdown of the causal cycle, this reciprocally counteracting juxta-
position actively prevents self-undermining from taking place.
The relatively stability of these structural synergies allows for a simple type of nat-
ural selection to occur, as different kinds of synergies may co-exist within the same
system. Some will be better suited to prevailing conditions than others and therefore
have a better chance of sustaining themselves. This eventually leads to an elimination
of noise (or reduction of variety) on a higher level, as unsuccessful noise-reducing syn-
ergies are removed. In this higher-order selection dynamic, a discontinuity becomes
apparent again, as the structured parts are separated in a competition caused by the
dissipative potential of the whole. This transition represents a shift in logic compara-
ble but opposite to the emergence of ordered structure from chaos: it could be argued
that this shift constitutes a secondary kind of emergent transition between dynamical
regimes.
73
6. CONSTRAINT, SELF-ORGANIZATION AND AUTOGENESIS
6.2.3 Autogen
The three-tiered constraint hierarchy of autogenesis is exemplified by a minimal model
system of life, the so-called autogen. In earlier publications (e.g. [38]), this model
system was referred to as ‘autocell’. However, since it exemplifies a general class of self-
generating systems (rather than being typically cellular) ‘autogen’ is the preferred term.
Autogens are formed by a synergistic relation between self-assembly and reciprocal
catalysis, both being self-organizing processes.
In a reciprocally catalytic system, each reaction initially leads to an increased prob-
ability for another reaction to take place, as more and more catalysts are created.
Exponential growth ensues until the reactants are depleted. Reciprocal catalysis leads
to exponential increase of reactions that is limited solely by the number of available
reactants. A boundary or container would prevent the exhaustion of reactants by re-
moving them from the environment, thereby preserving a chemical potential for further
dissipation [113]. Such a container may itself be formed by a self-organizing process,
e.g. crystal growth through self-assembly [48]. Autogenesis, then, suggests that the
form and function of a self-assembled container is dynamically linked to the autocat-
alytic process as it prevents the reactants from being depleted. Similarly, it explains
how the autocatalytic process dynamically shapes the form and function of the crystals
as it affects the process of self-assembly.
The autogen model is illustrated in figure 6.1. Particles of type A and B react to
form a C particle, catalyzed by particles of type F . A similar reaction takes place for
particles of type D and E, which form F and G particles, catalyzed by C particles.
In the same system, G particles attach to one another creating self-assembled crystals
of type Gn, with n for the number of G particles the crystal consists of. Due to their
particular form, these crystals may contain catalysts, thereby negatively affecting the
immediate production of G particles but ensuring a potential for G-particle production
over time. The negative part of the structural coupling ensures that self-assembly
stops before the catalysts are depleted, even though they are contained and therefore
not readily available in the environment. This reaction potential is employed when a
crystal opens up after detachment: contained catalysts are released, initiating a new
chain of catalytic reactions that provides new G particles used to repair the container,
after which it may close again, thereby completing the work cycle.
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of autogen formation (left) and the reactions involved (right).
Autogens constitute a dynamical linkage between self-assembly and reciprocal catalysis.
In this model system, self-assembly is a self-organizing process where G particles attach to
one another, forming Gn crystals of size n. These crystals may break up due to detachment.
G particles are generated by a reciprocally catalytic set of six different particle types (A
to F ). In turn, crystals may contain C and F particles, isolating these catalysts from
potential reactants.
The autogenic process as a whole then gains a minimal form of autonomy: as it is able to
do work on its own conditions for sustenance, it grows independent from the conditions
of its environment and becomes more dependent on its own internalized constraint.
Under some conditions that are strived to be maintained, probability of growth and
sustainment is higher than that of breakdown. When the autogen is damaged, it
likely begins to repair itself. Autogenesis is about the higher-order constraint on the
constraint generating processes of which it is constituted, such that a self is reproduced.
It is a dynamic for the maintenance of itself as it maintains an implicit description of
its units of preservation.
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6.3 The Autogenic Automaton
The logical steps building up to autogenesis, exemplified by the autogen model de-
scribed above, are simulated with the Autogenic Automaton. Other computational
proto-life models have simulated the formation of containers, the emergence of collec-
tively autocatalystic sets, or both [115, 162]. Although this simulation falls into the
latter category, the goal here is not to provide a physically accurate model of either
self-organizing process, nor of their synergy, but rather to demonstrate the viability of
the logical hierarchy leading up to this synergy.
Figure 6.2: A continuous, closed particle system (left) is modeled in the Autogenic
Automaton as a discrete grid of 10 x 10 tiles (right).
6.3.1 Model
A two-dimensional 10 x 10 tile grid is used as a discrete model of a closed reaction-
diffusion system (figure 6.2). Particle movement and the reaction rules that govern
particle attachment, detachment, and the creation and removal of particles are all
computed locally per tile. In this sense, the system resembles a cellular automaton al-
lowing for emergence [11], where tiles may be occupied by multiple particles. Diffusion
caused by particle-to-particle collisions is approximated by randomly directed move-
ment to a horizontally or vertically neighboring tile with probability Pmovement = 0.1
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at every time step, for each particle.
Particle-to-particle reactions and associated probabilities are modeled after crystal-
lization and reciprocal catalysis. To this end, six particle types are defined and used
for modeling reciprocal catalysis while a seventh type models the formation of crystals
through self-assembly. Further implementation details, including the reaction rules, are
given in section 6.9.
6.3.2 Simulation
The Autogenic Automaton is initialized by assigning random grid locations to a pre-
defined quantity of particles of each type. Next, for a given number of time steps, new
particle positions are computed and the reaction rules are applied to the particles at
each tile.
One advantage of these localized reactions is that only small subsets of the total
number of particles interact at each time step, reducing the computational complexity
of the simulation. Another way to keep the model relatively simple and the simulation
computationally tractable is to model only the aspects of self-organization that are
necessary for showing the viability of autogenesis, which include nonlinear probability
functions and reversible reactions. Other physical properties typical for particle systems
(e.g. kinetic energy, dissipation of heat) are not modeled.
In order to show the generation and elimination of constraint (i.e. macroscopic
change) over time, the simulation starts in non-equilibrium conditions. Due to the
absence of heat and friction, the entropy potential necessary for far-from-equilibrium
systems to be self-organizing is not defined with respect to thermodynamic equilibrium
(when all movement and reactions have ceased to occur) but rather with respect to
chemical equilibrium. Thus, the initial set of particles is not in chemical equilibrium
since no crystallization has occurred nor has a catalytic reaction taken place. So, the
macroscopic change that is observed in the experiments that follow may be attributed
to the system moving toward a chemical equilibrium.
6.3.3 Quantifying Constraint
Through the course of a simulation run, particles move and collide against one another
to create new particles or crystals, or they fall apart. The system moves through
various macroscopic states, caused or maintained by processes that generate, eliminate,
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preserve or select constraint; the quantification of statistical entropy described here
yields an indirect observation of the underlying processes.
Constraint is expressed by means of the information entropy over the spatial prob-
ability distribution of particular event types in the tile grid [74, 92, 127]. Notable
characteristics of the particle system surface by observing the (in-)homogeneity of the
locations of events that correspond to these characteristics, such as the presence of a
particle type or the occurrence of a specific reaction.
Given a set of probabilities pi for i = 1, . . . , ntiles with 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 and
∑
i pi = 1,
information entropy is defined as [32, 141]:
H = −
ntiles∑
i=1
pi log2 pi .
Now, when we consider an event X, we substitute
pi =
|Xi|
|X| ,
with |Xi| the number of events at tile i and |X| =
∑
i |Xi| the total number of events,
to obtain
H(X) = −
ntiles∑
i=1
|Xi|
|X| log2
|Xi|
|X| .
For ease of interpretation we often consider the so-called normalized information en-
tropy [89]
Hˆ(X) = − 1
log2 ntiles
ntiles∑
i=1
|Xi|
|X| log2
|Xi|
|X| , (6.1)
which normalizes the standard information entropy by its maximum value such that
always 0 ≤ Hˆ(X) ≤ 1. For a completely homogeneous distribution of events over tiles
we now have Hˆ(X) = 1, whereas Hˆ(X) = 0 when all events X are concentrated at a
single tile.
6.3.4 Quantifying Multiple Constraint Types
Where it is necessary to consider the interaction between two dynamical processes, the
Kullback-Leibler divergence is used [100]:
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DKL(P ||Q) =
ntiles∑
i=1
pi log2
pi
qi
.
Given two event types X and Y , their co-location in the tile grid gives an indirect
measure of this interaction. Substituting pi and qi with
|Xi|
|X| and
|Yi|
|Y | , respectively,
would yield infinite divergence for a distribution with a tile i such that |Xi| > 0 and
|Yi| = 0. To resolve this problem, a smoothing function is used [10], where
qi =
{
α |Yi||Y | for |Yi| > 0
 for |Yi| = 0
, (6.2)
with  = 10−5 and normalization coefficient α chosen such that the probabilities sum
to 1. pi is substituted similarly with
|Xi|
|X| . For ease of exposition, we will omit this
smoothing in subsequent formulas.
6.4 Constraint Generation
The Autogenic Automaton is used to simulate the generation of constraint in two
separate self-organizing processes: the formation of crystals through self-assembly, and
the local amplification of reactions taking place in a reciprocally catalytic set.
6.4.1 Self-Assembly
Self-assembly is modeled by a series of attachment and detachment reactions between
G particles and crystals Gn with reaction parameters γ+ and γ−:
Gn +G Gn+1 , (6.3)
with n ≥ 1 and G1 ≡ G. If a G particle is located within the same tile as either another
G particle or crystal, the probability of attachment is given by
P+g = γ
+ ∈ [0, 1] .
Modeling detachment as the opposite of attachment, crystals have a probability P−g
of a G particle detaching from the crystal. Larger crystals are more tightly connected
and less likely to break apart than smaller crystals due to a larger number of kinks
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holding the individual particles together [21]. An increased size yields a lower proba-
bility of detachment and therefore increases the probability for further growth. This
introduces a nonlinearity in the crystal growth process, reflected in our model system
by a detachment probability function that is negatively exponential to the crystal size
n.
P−g = (1 + exp[γ
−])−n ,
with γ− ∈ R, n ≥ 2. Following equation (6.1), event Xi is defined with respect to self-
assembly as the observation of a G particle at tile i, where Gn crystals are counted as
n observations. Therefore, the generation of constraint during this process is examined
using
Hˆ(G, t) = − 1
log2 ntiles
ntiles∑
i=1
|Gi(t)|
|G(t)| log2
|Gi(t)|
|G(t)| ,
for the normalized information entropy ofG at time t. Figure 6.3 shows the development
of Hˆ(G, t) over time, for different values of γ−. With γ− = −5, the probability of
detachment P−g is relatively high, such that many crystals fall apart and the constraint
on particle G locations is low. With γ− ∈ [−1,−2], P−g is relatively low: once formed,
crystals do not break apart, leaving no single G particles for attachment and no room
for further growth. The G particle locations are maximally constrained for γ− = −4.
6.4.2 Reciprocal catalysis
Particle types A to F are used to model self-organization through reciprocal catalysis.
Particles of type A and type B may react to form a C particle when both are located
in the same tile; similarly for particles D and E forming an F :
A+B
F
 C , (6.4)
D + E
C
 F . (6.5)
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Figure 6.3: Decrease of normalized information entropy Hˆ(G, t) during self-assembly of
1000 G particles with γ+ = 1, for several detachment probabilities: γ− = −5,
γ− = −4, γ− = −3, γ− = −2, γ− = −1. The
images on the right depict how Hˆ(G, t) correlates with the distribution of G particles over
the grid at the end of a run, ranging from an almost homogeneous distribution (top) to a
few Gn crystals (bottom). Results are averaged over 100 trial runs.
Particles F and C are catalysts for reactions (6.4) and (6.5), respectively. Reaction
probability P+r increases exponentially with n, the number of catalysts present at the
same tile i (i.e. n = |Fi| for the former reaction, and n = |Ci| for the latter)
P+r = (1 + exp[%
+])−(1+n)
−2
,
with %+ ∈ R. The reverse reactions (C particles splitting into A and B particles and F
into D and E) occurs with probability P−r for every C or F particle, at each time step
P−r = %
− ∈ [0, 1] .
Similar to self-assembly, reciprocal catalysis is a locally nonlinear process: one catalytic
reaction increases the likelihood of another catalytic reaction occurring. However, the
observable artifacts of reciprocal catalysis (i.e. the produced catalysts) may cease to
exist once this amplification process no longer takes place, or they may diffuse to
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different locations. To quantify the amount of constraint generated, we therefore use
the probability distribution of reaction locations as observed events, rather than the
catalysts themselves.
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Figure 6.4: Normalized information entropy during reciprocal catalysis, after initializa-
tion with 1000 particles distributed equally among types A, B, D, and E. For given %+
and %−, Hˆ(R, t) is averaged over 5000 time steps and 10 trial runs. The right-side images
depict the distribution of catalytic reactions over the grid at the end of a run.
The constraint generated by reciprocal catalysis is quantified by a decrease in nor-
malized information entropy over the distribution of catalytic reaction loci R at time
t:
Hˆ(R, t) = − 1
log2 ntiles
ntiles∑
i=1
|Ri(t)|
|R(t)| log2
|Ri(t)|
|R(t)| .
In order to investigate the effect of parameters %+ and %− on the normalized information
entropy, Hˆ(R, t) is averaged over time:
1
tmax
tmax∑
t=1
Hˆ(R, t) .
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Results for tmax = 5000 are shown in figure 6.4. We found that distribution R is most
constrained for %+ ≈ 6 and %− > 0.5 (i.e. catalysts break up regularly) .
Figure 6.5: Elimination of constraint: the Autogenic Automaton is initialized with 1000
G particles and γ+ = 1, γ− = −2. At t = 1000, γ− is changed: γ− = −5,
γ− = −4, γ− = −3, γ− = −2, γ− = −1. For γ− ∈
[−3,−4] the eventual decrease in information entropy is preceded by an initial increase.
Results are averaged over 100 trials.
6.5 Constraint Elimination
Self-organizing processes are enabled by specific conditions that promote local ampli-
fications. Due to change initiated by self-undermining (or imposed externally) the
boundaries of these conditions may be transgressed leading to an elimination of previ-
ously generated constraint. This process can be demonstrated by means of a so-called
process spectrometry : after an initial phase with conditions that enable self-assembly,
the value of γ− is changed, and the effect on the normalized information entropy is
observed (figure 6.5).
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The figure shows that after t = 1000 the normalized information entropy is (initially)
higher for γ− ∈ [−5,−3]. After some time this value decreases as constraint grows: G
particles that have previously detached from small crystals now attach to others, such
that only large crystals remain. Within the 5000 time steps shown, this effect results
in higher local concentrations of G particles, less homogeneity, a lower value of Hˆ(G, t)
and more constraint for γ− ∈ [−4,−3].
6.6 Constraint Preservation
The higher-order linkage between self-assembly and reciprocal catalysis has been dis-
cussed in section 6.2.3, where a mutually constraining coupling is suggested that works
in two directions:
1. G particles generated by autocatalysis are created in close proximity to one an-
other, due to the locality of the catalytic amplifications, thereby increasing the
likelihood of crystal growth;
2. crystals may act as containers for catalysts, preventing the reciprocally catalytic
process from undermining itself and preserving a potential for catalysis at a later
point in time.
Modeling this synergetic linkage, reaction 6.5 is changed as follows:
D + E
C→ F +G .
This increases the likelihood of G particles being produced in close proximity to a
catalytic reaction. For the reverse linkage, a crystal needs to be capable of containing
catalysts upon formation, to be released again when the crystal breaks up. Therefore
reaction 6.3 is changed, where a crystal of size n containing k C particles and m F
particles is denoted as Gn(kC,mF ):
Gn(kC,mF ) +G+ pC + qF → Gn+1((k + p)C, (m+ q)F ) ,
Gn(kC,mF )→ Gn−1 +G+ kC +mF ,
with k,m, p, q ≥ 0 and n ≥ 2. The continuous addition of G particles is balanced by
removing G particles at each time step with probability P−g = (1 + exp[γ−])−1.
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6.6.1 Parameterization
Thus far, four reaction parameters have been introduced: γ+, γ−, %+ and %−. The
results in section 6.4.1 showed that a decrease in Hˆ(G, t) may occur when γ+ is fixed
at 1. Similarly, figure 6.4 shows that %− > 0.5 allows for relatively low values of Hˆ(R, t).
Given these values, we investigate the ranges of γ− and %+ that allow for both types
of self-organization to occur simultaneously.
The redundancy between the distributions of G particle locations and catalytic
reactions is considered to be an indication of the amount of interaction between both
processes, i.e. it measures whether crystals tend to be located in proximity to catalytic
reactions, and vice versa. This is quantified using the Kullback-Leibler divergence with
smoothing (eq. 6.2), which is symmetrized to obtain a commutative measure:
SDKL(G,R, t) = DKL(G(t)||R(t)) +DKL(R(t)||G(t))
=
ntiles∑
i=1
[ |Gi(t)|
|G(t)| −
|Ri(t)|
|R(t)|
]
log2
[ |Gi(t)|
|G(t)|
/ |Ri(t)|
|R(t)|
]
,
with smoothing (eq. 6.2) applied if necessary. Running constraint preservation experi-
ments requires parameterization of γ− and %+ such that
(a) self-assembly takes place (i.e. Hˆ(G, t) is low);
(b) reciprocal catalysis takes place (i.e. Hˆ(R, t) is low);
(c) both processes take place in each other’s proximity (i.e. SDKL(G,R, t) is low).
Figure 6.6 shows these three measurements averaged over 5000 time steps for different
values of γ− and %+. The desired parameter values are estimated by minimizing
Hˆ(G, t) + Hˆ(R, t) + β SDKL(G,R, t) ,
where coefficient β scales SDKL(G,R, t) to [0, 2]
β = 2
(
max
γ−, ρ+∈[−10,10]
SDKL(G,R, t)
)−1
,
such that the normalized information entropies and the divergence between the distri-
butions contribute equally to the sum.
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Figure 6.6: After initializing the simulation with 1000 particles evenly distributed among
types A, B, D and E, it is run for 5000 time steps with γ+ = 1, %− = 0.5 and γ−, %+ ∈
[−10, 10]. The four figures above show the average normalized information entropy of
G particle locations (top left), the average normalized information entropy of catalytic
reaction locations (top right), the average symmetrized Kullback-Leibler divergence with
smoothing, where SDKL(γ
−, %+) = max(SDKL) if no occurrences are found (bottom
left), and the sum of these three figures, where SDKL has been normalized using scaling
coefficient β (bottom right).
6.6.2 Preservation
Using the parameter values found, a process spectrometry is generated (figure 6.7).
For γ− ∈ [−5,−4] after t = 1000, the high probability of detachment is not conducive
to the prolonged persistence of crystals, and they fall apart. For γ− remaining at
0, Hˆ(G, t) continues to develop unperturbed. Changing γ− to −1 results in a lower
normalized information entropy, as more G particles detach and subsequently attach
to larger crystals (cf. figure 6.3). With γ− changed to −2, Hˆ(G, t) initially drops, but
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eventually finds a new equilibrium at a higher value than with γ− ∈ [−1, 0].
Figure 6.7: Normalized information entropy Hˆ(G, t) during autogenesis (left) and self-
assembly without reciprocal catalysis where instead of being generated by a catalytic reac-
tion, G particles are added to random grid locations with the same rate as in the previous
simulation (right). With γ+ = 1, %+ = 6, %− = 0.5, and γ− = 0 for t ∈ [0, 1000], and 1000
particles evenly distributed among types A, B, D and E initially. For t ∈ [1001, 5000],
γ− = −4, γ− = −3, γ− = −2, γ− = −1,
γ− = 0. Results are averaged over 1000 trials.
By itself, this figure provides limited insight into the processes that underlie the produc-
tion, elimination and preservation of constraint. However, it may be compared against
a similar experiment that lacks a higher-order linkage. Since Hˆ(G, t) only measures the
constraint of the distribution of G particles, the experiment is repeated without the
set of particles necessary for reciprocal catalysis. During the process spectrometry of
figure 6.7 (left), the number of G particles that were added at each time step is stored.
In this second experiment, G particles are created at random grid locations at exactly
the same rate. This allows for self-assembly to take place under similar circumstances,
but decoupled from reciprocal catalysis. G particle creation occurs at the same rate,
although spatial proximity is no longer biased by reciprocal catalysis, and the absence
of catalysts excludes the possibility of containment.
The results of this self-assembly experiment are shown in figure 6.7 (right). Compar-
ing both figures, it is found for γ− = −2 that constraint is preserved when a synergetic
linkage between self-assembly and reciprocal catalysis is present, while it largely falls
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apart in the case of mere self-assembly. Also for γ− = −1, the value of Hˆ(G, t) remains
lower with this linkage than without. This is not the case when γ− remains at 0. Here,
self-assembly results in a more constrained system than when combined with reciprocal
catalysis.
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Figure 6.8: Fixing γ− at −0.5 and γ+ = 1, %+ = 6, and %− = 0.5, the grid is again
initialized with 1000 particles of types A, B, D and E. For 1000 trial runs over 5000
time steps, the mean crystal size and standard error of the mean are reported for the five
different containment capacities.
6.7 Constraint Selection
The preservation of constraint is a higher-order process: not only is noise reduced as
the spatial distribution of events becomes more constrained, but the distribution over
specific constraint types, e.g. the specific form of crystals, is itself also reduced.
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Figure 6.9: Due to the way G particles attach to one another, crystals with specific
topologies may come about. This illustration shows several crystals Gnc of equal size (i.e.
n = 5) but with different capacities (c) for containing catalysts, due their specific form.
In order to experimentally show the emergence of such higher-order constraint, the
containment capacity of crystals is limited by their specific form (figure 6.9). This is
reflected in the Autogenic Automaton by initializing each new crystal with property c,
a random value ranging from 1 to 5 that indicates the maximum number of catalysts
a crystal may contain.
Figure 6.8 shows the average size of crystals compared against their maximum con-
tainment capacity, for both autogenesis and self-assembly without reciprocal catalysis.
The results reveal two differences. First, a difference in crystal size between autogene-
sis and self-assembly, which could have been inferred from the results of the previous
constraint preservation experiments.
The second difference is that, for autogenesis, a crystal’s containment capacity is
correlated with its average size. In our model system, the removal probability P−g is
independent of the specific crystal form, so the maximum containment of a crystal
does not affect its size directly. Rather, the value of c indirectly affects the growth of
crystals, as the numbers of catalysts present at a tile will affect the production of new
G particles, and thereby a crystal’s capacity for formation (or reconstitution) if those
catalysts are released upon detachment. This work cycle creates a difference in size
between the different crystal topologies, which is maintained despite the independence
between crystal topology and the underlying self-organizing processes.
This higher-order constraint may be quantified using the normalized information
entropy over the distribution of the containment capacities of crystals. With pc the
probability that a crystal has a containment capacity c, |Gnc | the number of crystals
with capacity c and |Gn| = ∑c |Gnc | the total number of crystals is
pc =
|Gnc |
|Gn| ,
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Figure 6.10: Higher-order constraint: the average normalized information entropy over
the distribution of crystal capacities Hˆ(Gnc , t) is substantially lower for autogenesis than
for self-assembly without reciprocal catalysis. Results averaged over 1000 trial runs.
Hˆ(Gnc , t) = −
1
log2 5
5∑
c=1
|Gnc (t)|
|Gn(t)| log2
|Gnc (t)|
|Gn(t)| .
Figure 6.10 shows the average Hˆ(Gnc , t) over the simulation runs of the previous ex-
periment for self-assembly and autogenesis. Selection of crystal topologies induced by
specific conditions accounts for the relatively low normalized information entropy over
containment capacities during autogenesis.
6.8 Conclusions
Constraint generation, elimination, preservation and selection have been shown to occur
in the Autogenic Automaton simulation under particular conditions. Taken together,
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these processes constitute self-organization and autogenesis, albeit in a minimal sense.
The self-undermining tendency of self-assembly and reciprocal catalysis is limited by
virtue of their second-order synergy – a higher-order constraint on these constraint
generating processes – leading to preservation of autogens and ultimately selection of
crystal topology.
The experimental explorations described in this chapter are not intended to quantify
autogenesis, or to give a full account of autogenic properties and phenomena. Rather,
they serve to demonstrate (1) the dynamics reversal that takes place in second-order
self-organization, and (2) the higher-order noise reduction constituted by formal type
selection that may emerge from competition between simple autogens. Those properties
are what sets autogenic systems apart from other models of the emergence of proto-life.
The hierarchical distinction between different types of constraint is reminiscent of
a logical-type distinction. Although the three statistical distributions used here (G
particle locations, R reaction locations, and Gnc containment capacities) are all subject
to quantification in terms of information entropy, this quantification does not distin-
guish between physico-chemical constraints expressed by the former two, and substrate
independent, formal constraint expressed by the latter. Since the physics underlying
the maintenance of far-from-equilibrium states have largely been ignored in this simu-
lation (cf. [6]), further research and simulation is required to develop tools capable of
expressing this dynamical difference [40].
6.9 Appendix: Model Description
A non-toroidal two-dimensional 10 x 10 tile grid is used as a discrete model of a reaction-
diffusion system containing seven different types of particles (A to G). At the start of
a simulation run, the particles are distributed randomly over the grid. Then, for each
time step, each particle may
1. move to a neighboring tile;
2. collide and react with other particles in the same tile;
3. break up.
These steps are described in more detail below.
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Movement
Random movement caused by bouncing against the edges of the grid, or particle-to-
particle collision, is approximated by randomly directed movement to a horizontally or
vertically neighboring tile with Pmovement = 0.1 for each particle or crystal.
Collision
Self-assembly of Gn crystals:
Gn +G→ Gn+1 ,
with reaction probability P+g = γ
+ ∈ [0, 1] with n ≥ 1. Reciprocal catalysis of particle
types A to F
A+B
F→ C ,
and
D + E
C→ F ,
with P+r = (1 + exp[%
+])−(1+n)−2 , %+ ∈ R and n the number of catalysts present at tile
i (i.e. n = |Fi| for the former reaction, and n = |Ci| for the latter). For the experiments
in sections 6 and 6.7, self-assembly and reciprocal catalysis are combined:
D + E
C→ F +G .
Containment is modeled by modifying the attachment reaction for self-assembly:
Gn(kC,mF ) +G+ pC + qF → Gn+1((k + p)C, (m+ q)F ) .
The experiments in section 6.7 feature a containment capacity c, representing the max-
imum number of catalysts a crystal may contain:
Gnc (kC,mF ) +G+ pC + qF → Gn+1c (k′C,m′F ) + p′C + q′F ,
with k′ +m′ ≤ c, k′ + p′ = k + p and m′ + q′ = m+ q. If k +m+ p+ q > c, the order
in which catalysts are contained is determined at random.
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Breakup
Particle types G, Gn, C and F have a probability of breaking up:
Gn → Gn−1 +G ,
with γ− ∈ R and P−g = (1 + exp[γ−])−n. If the crystal contains catalysts, they are
released upon detachment (irrespective of the containment capacity c):
Gn(kC,mF )→ Gn−1 +G+ kC +mF .
Furthermore,
C → A+B ,
and
F → D + E ,
with reaction probability P−r = %− ∈ [0, 1]. In sections 6 and 6.7, G particles are
removed from the grid with P−g = (1 + exp[γ−])−1.
93
94
PART III
CREATIVITY SUPPORT TOOLS
95
96
7CHRONICLING CULTURAL
ANCESTRY THROUGH
CONCEPTUAL CLASSIFICATION
The application of phylogenetic techniques to the documentation of cultural history
can present a distorted picture due to horizontal transmission (i.e. transfer to or from
the lineage of a group, rather than within) and conceptual blending. Moreover, the
units of cultural transmission must be communicable concepts, rather than conveniently
measurable attributes, and relatedness between elements of culture often resides at the
conceptual level, something not captured by phylogenetic methods, which focus on
measurable attributes. For example, mortars and pestles are as related as two artifacts
could be, despite little similarity at the attribute level. This chapter1 introduces a
new, cognitively inspired framework for chronicling material cultural history, building
on Lipo’s [110] network-based computational approach. We show that by incorporating
not just superficial attributes of artifact samples (e.g. shape) but also conceptual
1This chapter appeared as [59] Gabora, L., Leijnen, S., Veloz, T. and Lipo, C. (2011). A Non-
Phylogenetic Conceptual Network Architecture for Organizing Classes of Material Artifacts into Cul-
tural Lineages. In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, July 20-23, 2011,
Boston, MA:2923–2928. My contribution included implementation, experimentation and dissemination
of those activities
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knowledge (e.g. information about function), a different pattern of cultural ancestry
emerges.
7.1 Introduction
The efforts of biologists, phylogeneticists, and others, have culminated in an impres-
sively detailed understanding of how the living things of today evolved. We can trace
the ancestral origins of our eyes and fingers, and even certain behavioral traits such as
mating preferences. However, we lack comprehensive knowledge of patterns of related-
ness of elements of culture, even restricting ourselves just to material artifacts.
This chapter discusses difficulties that have arisen in attempting to chronicle ma-
terial cultural history using phylogenetic and network based approaches. We then
describe our new conceptual network approach. The insight that guides this approach
is: since artifacts are the product of minds that encode representations of them not just
at the attribute level but also at an abstract, conceptual level, to reconstruct material
cultural evolution, it is necessary to incorporate how artifacts are conceived, and how
these conceptions interact in a human mind. We introduce a computer program that is
able to construct such networks from both attribute data and conceptual information.
7.2 Phylogenetic Approaches
Since artifacts undergo ‘descent with modification’, the theory of natural selection
appears to offer a means for explaining cultural history. Accordingly, phylogenetic
methods such as cladistics are routinely borrowed from biology and applied in an ar-
chaeological context [121, 122]. In cladistic representations of archaeological data, the
measured attributes of a ‘taxon’ of artifacts are listed as a number string. The position
in the string is loosely analogous to the concept of gene, and the number at that posi-
tion is loosely analogous to the concept of allele. Thus if a taxon is represented by 132
then the first attribute is in state one, the second is in state three, and the third is in
state two. For example, consider the representation of early projectile points from the
Southeastern United States shown in figure 7.1 [121]. The data consist of metric and
morphological measurements with respect to eight attributes, each of which can take
from two to six possible states. Thus, for example, if fluting is absent in a particular
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artifact, it has a 1 in position VII, and if fluting is present it has a 2. Seventeen ‘taxa’
are identified, and the pattern is such that one common ancestor (identified as KDR)
gave rise to sequential branching’s that culminated in 16 different taxa. This technique
provides an intuitively meaningful (although potentially misleading) means of captur-
ing structural change. The ‘root taxon’ at the far left is the most primitive, and early
branch points represent changes that provided the structural constraints that shaped
more recent changes. For example, much as evolution of the backbone paved the way
for limbs, evolution of containers paved the way for spouts and handles.
Phylogenetic approaches have also been applied to culture in more complex ways.
For example, relationships amongst different elements of culture have been analyzed by
comparing their phylogenetic trees. The procedure involves running a series of forward
models, one in which the phenomena are assumed to evolve completely independently,
another in which one kind of correlation is assumed (e.g. matriliny1 with cattle),
another in which a different correlation is assumed (e.g. patriliny with cattle). These
are compared to the language phylogeny, which is assumed to be the most accurate
available cultural history tree, to determine which gives the best match. This method
can indeed unearth relationships amongst different elements of culture. It was found,
for example, that the spread of pastoralism in Sub-Saharan Africa is associated with
a shift from matriliny to patriliny [81]. However, the method is ineffective if there is
rampant blending of cultural elements, and it does not generate information about why
or how elements of culture are related.
7.2.1 Shortcomings of Phylogenetic Approaches
Despite the intuitiveness and scientific rigor of phylogenetic/cladistic approaches, and
some apparent successes applying them to culture, concerns have been raised about
distortions generated by these cultural applications [55, 110, 154, 155]. We now examine
these concerns.
7.2.1.1 Similarity Need Not Reflect Homology
Phylogenetic methods assume that similarity reflects homology, i.e. that two species
are similar because they are related. Specifically, it assumes that, either (1) one is
1matriliny means that traits are inherited through the female line; inheritance through the male
line is called patriliny
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Figure 7.1: Phylogenetic representation of Paleo-Indian period projectile points from the
Southeastern United States with 17 taxa defined by 18 attributes. From O’Brien et al.
[121].
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descended from the other, in which case shared traits were transmitted vertically, or
(2) they are descended from a common ancestor, which is depicted as a branch point.
For example, common ancestry can occur through fission, in which a population splits
in two, which become increasingly differentiated.
However, similarity need not reflect homology. Artifacts may arise independently,
yet be similar because they are alternative solutions within similar design constraints.
Convergent evolution occurs in a biological context too. However, because organisms
must solve many problems (reproduction, locomotion, digestion, etc.) the probability
that a species is mis-categorized on the basis of how it solves any one problem is
low. Artifacts, on the other hand, are generally constructed with a single use in mind.
(Though artifacts developed for use in one context may be used to solve other problems,
e.g., a screwdriver may be used to open a can of paint). Therefore, the probability of
mis-categorization arising through the assumption that similarity reflects homology is
problematic for artifacts.
7.2.1.2 Blending
Cultural relatedness frequently arises through not just vertical transmission but hori-
zontal (inter-lineage) transmission, which can result in the blending of knowledge from
different sources. Since inter-lineage transfer of information is relatively rare in animals,
phylogenetic methods are ill-equipped to deal with it. Extensive horizontal transmis-
sion gives a bushy, reticulated appearance to a phylogenetic tree, which is misleading
because it implies not just chronology but ancestry.
Blending is problematic for cladistic methods because it forces one to parse the data
according to predefined attributes or characters. So one is a priori discouraged from
incorporating data that does not fit into this parsing. In biology, such parsing arises
naturally stemming from how traits are genetically encoded. The chosen attributes
are characteristic of that species, and the rarity of inter-species mating ensures that
they don’t change drastically. However, in culture, nothing is a priori prohibited from
‘mating with’ anything else. Those who apply phylogenetics to culture respond that
such problems rarely arise in the study of prehistory. On the basis of a set of studies of
virtually indistinguishable artifacts, Collard et al. [28] insinuate that cultural blending
is not widely present. This, however, reflects their highly limited choice of artifacts; a
brief examination of the contents of any modern house would lead one to a different
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conclusion. Moreover, even if one is more interested in prehistoric culture than con-
temporary culture, one seeks not a bag of tricks for assessing relatedness each of which
is applicable to certain data sets, but an explanatory framework that fits them all.
7.2.1.3 Lack of Objective Measure of Relatedness
A more fundamental problem with phylogenetic approaches to culture is that they
assume it is possible to accurately measure the relatedness of artifacts. Whether or
not two organisms share a common ancestor is clear-cut; they either are or are not
descendants of a particular individual. One can objectively measure what percentage
of the genomes of two species overlap, and make conclusions about their degree of
genetic relatedness. But in a cultural context, whether or not two artifacts “share a
common ancestor” can be arbitrary, and moreover, what is measured is not necessarily
what was culturally transmitted.
7.2.1.4 Predefined Attributes
The data of figure 7.1 are typical of those to which a phylogenetic approach is amenable
because the taxa are very similar to one another. That is, each taxon has one version or
another of the considered attributes; there are no major modifications in this lineage.
A problem pointed out by Alex Bentley (pers. com.) is that the units considered are
those that are most amenable to analysis rather than those that were most likely to
have been transmitted from teacher to apprentice. Thus the method documents readily
measurable change, not the actual cultural ancestry of the artifact.
7.3 Lipo’s Network (LN) Approach
Network-based methods appear to avert the above problems by simply ordering data
according to similarity without necessarily implying common ancestry [110]. Analysis
of the same data yields quite a different pattern of evolutionary change. Following
O’Brien, samples that are rated the same with respect to all considered attributes are
categories together as a particular taxon. Attributes are encoded as a number string.
Each position in the string refers to a particular attribute, and the number at a position
refers to the state of that attribute for the taxon. This is shown in figure 7.2.
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Taxa are simply arranged according to the number of attributes by which they differ.
The majority of taxa have two lines coming from them, one to a taxon that preceded
it, and one to a taxon that followed it; the network does not specify which is which.
Those that have more (e.g. 31222122) reflect the existence of multiple other taxa with
the same number of differences.
Several aspects of the procedure are noteworthy. First, the network-based approach
does not make a priori assumptions about the sources of diversity. It is uncommitted
with respect to whether differences reflect branching due to fission or blending due
to transmission. Second, the method is also uncommitted with respect to chronology.
Additional data indicate the directionality of the evolutionary pathway, as shown in
figure 7.3.
7.3.1 Limitations of the LN Approach
We believe that in order to avoid the limitations of phylogenetic methods, a move in the
direction of network representations is inevitable. However, this initial implementation
has limitations.
7.3.1.1 Considers Only Superficial Attributes.
This approach is suitable for artifacts that are highly similar at the superficial attribute
level. However, it cannot to handle artifacts whose similarity resides at the conceptual
level. For example, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the stoplight has (at least)
two cultural ancestors – the streetlight and the car – the first contributing the necessary
expertise (mastery over the technological design space of external lighting), and the
second contributing the necessary motive (control traffic). The second is as crucial as
the first; if cars (or something like them) had not come into existence, stoplights would
not have come into existence. However, the network approach does not provide a way
to document this. Their lack of low-level similarity means that this relationship cannot
be reconstructed using this method.
7.3.1.2 Assumes Single-Attribute Change.
The LN architecture assumes that the evolutionary path cannot be resolved when there
are multiple attribute differences between neighboring taxa. This is not the case when
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Figure 7.2: Graph produced by linking taxa to their most similar neighbors. Bold lines
represent differences of only one attribute. Thin solid lines show differences of two at-
tributes. Dotted lines show differences of three attributes. The multiple lines connecting
taxon 31222122 to other taxa indicate ambiguity due to equivalent number of differences
between multiple taxa. From Lipo [110].
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conceptual structure is taken into account; multiple differences (or even complete lack of
similarity) at the attribute level may reflect single changes at the concept level. More-
over, once the conceptual level is introduced, it is no longer necessary to restrict oneself
to independent attributes. Indeed, dependencies amongst attributes may indicate the
presence of conceptual structure that may hold the clue to the artifact’s evolutionary
story.
7.3.1.3 Constraints on Attributes.
Third, the length of the number string and the attributes considered are determined a
priori according to certain rules: attributes must be independent, and there must be
no significant difference in the fitness of alternative states, i.e. only neutral variation
is considered. The rationale behind these rules is that they rule out similarity due to
convergence (e.g. structural constraints). There is also an implied preference for data
with taxa that differ from one another by only one attribute, because in such cases the
pattern of ancestry can be resolved without ambiguity. When there are differences of
multiple attributes between a taxon and its nearest neighbor, the evolutionary path
cannot be resolved (e.g. the transition from 111 to 122 could occur by way of either
112 or 121). The underlying assumption is that innovation involves one superficial
attribute at a time, so a lack of single-attribute change between neighboring classes is
assumed to indicate an incomplete data set. However, this assumption is not always
met. For example, Te¨mkin & Eldredge’s [154] cornet data exhibits “well-documented
temporally spaced sequences of “missing links” that likely indicate an actual pattern
of ancestry and descent” (p. 150).
The network method has the limitation that to chronicle the evolution of a lineage
that is increasing in complexity, one would either have to go backwards and add place-
holders for traits that did not previously exist, or clump together a great variety of
taxa as indistinguishable instances of the terminus. To document the history of human
material culture, our framework must accommodate, for example, that this lineage, or
one like it, eventually gave rise to the gun. The gun has few of the attributes considered
thus far in analyses of this lineage such as ‘fluting’ or ‘arc-shaped base’. Its similarity,
indeed our sense that it belongs in this lineage, is conceptual; it reflects the way it is
conceived of and used by humans.
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Figure 7.3: Graphical analysis of projectile point data with temporal information (from
Anderson et al. [2]) indicated by degree of shading of circles. (From Lipo [110]).
In sum, the network method is a sensible, rigorous way of organizing archaeological
data. However, due to its assumed independence of attributes, consideration of only
superficial attributes, and fixed-length attribute strings, the resulting framework for
cultural evolution is fragmentary, limited in application to what many would find the
least interesting, or at any rate the least innovative, periods of cultural change.
7.4 The Conceptual Network (CN) Approach
The project described here builds on Lipo’s network-based method but adds conceptual
structure. As is conventional, concepts are indicated with capitals. Thus an instance
of a projectile point is written as ‘projectile point’ but the concept of one is written
as PROJECTILE POINT. The more superficial level of conceptual structure consists
of what Rosch [132] refers to as basic level concepts such as PROJECTILE POINT
and KNIFE. Basic level concepts mirror the attributes of objects in the external world.
This basic level is the level at which items are first perceived, and it is the level at which
we generally refer to and interact with them. In some cases it may be more natural to
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work at a finer level of discrimination and thus consider a more subordinate concep-
tual level, e.g. BEVELED KNIFE instead of KNIFE. The important thing is that this
superficial level be rich in attributes. The less superficial, more abstract level of con-
ceptual structure consists of superordinate concepts such as WEAPON. Superordinate
concepts often refer to multiple basic level categories (e.g. PROJECTILE POINT and
KNIFE are both instances of WEAPON), and they are more general than the level at
which we refer to and interact with items (e.g. different kinds of weapon are interacted
with in different ways). Basic level concepts and superordinate concepts can take us a
long way toward a representation of how objects in the world and their interrelations
are conceptualized.
To organize material culture in a way that allows for projectile points to evolve into
guns, we incorporate a minimal amount of conceptual structure. The structure of the
concept PROJECTILE POINT may include not just that it has certain attributes but
also that it is an instance of the concept WEAPON. Sometimes the structure of concepts
derives from their history (how they were conceived in the past), and sometimes from
other sources (e.g. horizontal transmission or copying error). The cognitive approach
uses networks to represent, not just taxa of artifacts, but relationships amongst them
as they are conceived of in the mind of a particular population of individuals at a
particular time and place.
The program was developed using the object-oriented Java platform with extension
packages for working with networks (JUNG) and Excel files (SX). The tool collects
meta-data for a set of known samples by asking the user questions about their pre-
sumed function and use. The questions are generated using a conceptual network that
determines which questions are relevant for the sample. This leads to the creation of
two networks: an attribute-level only one, and one that incorporates meta-data. Other
software functions allow the user to export and import data sets for later use, storing
meta-data and networks.
7.4.1 Data Samples
Data can be entered into the program either manually, filling out fields for each sam-
ple, or using batch excel files that contain all samples that need to be evaluated. Both
import methods require a series of entry fields to be filled out in order for the program
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Figure 7.4: Image of Graham3 sample.
to query the user in the next stage. These entries are as follows:
Entry Description Example
Sample name Unique name that identifies the sample Graham3
Sample attributes Features encoded as a numeric string 2262233212221
Generic type Group to which this sample belongs Graham Cave
Period Estimated period of the sample’s original use 7,000–5,500 BC
Location Describes where the sample has been found Cooper Site
Image Picture of sample see fig. 7.4
7.4.2 Conceptual Networks
The samples are described by a set of superficial attributes related to their relative sizes
and shapes, the material from which they were constructed, and so forth. Since the
intended function of an artifact does not follow unambiguously from these attributes,
a human expert capable of deducing function from shape, and who may also have
knowledge concerning their location and period, provides additional information to
aid the computer program in determining how the samples are related. Following
Dunnell [45], we define function in terms of the relationship between an object and its
environment, including both natural and artificial aspects. Variability in the physical
aspects of objects sometimes reflects function. For example, broad, thick objects have
lower performance values than narrow ones for piercing, and objects that interact with
air at any velocity are shaped by aerodynamics. Since the number of possible functions
that an artifact could have is potentially infinite, the program asks only those questions
that are relevant for a particular sample based on assessment of attributes. Since thus
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far much of the data has consisted of projectile points, all samples trigger the question,
‘Was the sample a projectile point’, and ‘Was the sample thrown’. Other examples of
questions asked include, ‘Was the sample used for cutting’.
7.4.3 Database
Answers given by human experts are stored as meta-data in the program. Since for
large datasets, an expert may not be able to handle the full set in one session, sets of
samples may be imported from and exported to text format files.
7.4.4 Generation of Lineages
The program analyses the superficial attributes and abstract (e.g. functional) aspects
of samples, and uses this information to generate networks that arrange the artifacts
according to how similar they are. Thus the network shows how the artifacts are likely
to have evolved chronologically. Relative distance between two samples x and y in the
original network is determined by the following algorithm:
N(x, y) = H(f(x), f(y)) (7.1)
where N is the distance without abstract concepts, H is the Hamming distance between
two encodings and f(x) is the attribute encoding of x. For the CN, the algorithm is
expanded with a function over the meta-data:
M(x, y) = N(x, y) +D(a(x), a(y)) (7.2)
Where D is a binary function that indicates whether two attributes are similar (0) or
different (1) and a(x) is a conceptual level attribute of x.
7.5 Results
Although the approach has not been tested comprehensively, in every test of ten or more
samples so far there is at least one difference in the chronological ordering of between
the CN approach and the original network approach. For comparative purposes, we
began with the same data that was analyzed using the previously described approaches.
An example of actual output of the program is given in figure 7.5. Since using the entire
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Figure 7.5: Two examples of network output given the same input data. Circles represent
particular samples. Numbered lines give estimates of relatedness (lower numbers more
closely related). The output on the left makes use of superficial attributes only. The
output on the right additionally makes use of conceptual meta-data.
data set generates output that is crowded and difficult to parse, the figure just shows
a subset of the data. The output shows both the original network approach and the
CN approach. In the LN approach, shown to the left, for any sample x, it is possible
that more than one of the other samples is equally similar to x, i.e. minimizes the
Hamming distance (the N(x, y) function) with respect to x. Therefore, using attributes
only, there is a large probability of generating the incorrect lineage. Regarding the
samples featured on the upper right, the method deduces that the terminal sample
‘Calfcreek’ is most closely related to the topmost sample, ‘Graham4’. Indeed based
on the superficial attributes only this was a reasonable guess. In the CN approach,
however, using conceptual information (the M(x, y) function), we can distinguish the
correct ordering on the basis of higher-level information. We see that the LN approach
guessed incorrectly, and that ‘Calfcreek’ is actually more closely related to ‘Graham2’,
the one below it, than to ‘Graham4’, the one guessed using the LN.
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7.6 Discussion
To reconstruct the history of the objects we build and use requires us to consider
conceptual relationships, and indeed, to reconstruct the history of conceptual change in
the minds that created them. The conceptual network approach introduced here avoids
pitfalls inherent in phylogenetic approaches. It builds on an earlier network-based
model, by adding the capacity to make use of not just superficial attributes of artifacts
but also abstract knowledge referred to as meta-level data. Though for this initial
analysis, for comparative purposes we used data that had been previously analyzed
using other approaches, the current approach can readily be applied to chronicling of
patterns of interrelatedness amongst artifacts of different kinds (e.g. one tool might
fall into disuse when a superior tool comes into existence, or the tool for procuring a
certain food might be expected to appear at the same time and location as the tool
for processing it). The approach is in its infancy; we continue to improve the program
through application of research from cognitive science on concept combination and
the formation of hierarchical conceptual structure [27, 95]. Though preliminary, we
believe that the approach holds promise in the quest to understand the ancestry of the
multitude of artifacts we have created.
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8CREATIVITY IN PROCEDURAL
CONTENT GENERATION FOR
VIDEO GAMES
Procedural content generation (PCG) aims to algorithmically produce original solutions
to game design challenges. This chapter1 investigates how computational creativity
theory can be applied to improve current PCG tools and techniques. We suggest that
content generation may be considered as a dual process: a generation step to create
variety and a resolution step to transform the output of the generation into a coherent
and useful configuration. Separating these two steps facilitates the design of PCG
algorithms and impacts the design of PCG tools.
8.1 Introduction
Procedural content generation (PCG) for games is a fast evolving discipline. Academic
research constantly tries to push the boundaries of the field by improving techniques
1This chapter is based on [44] Dormans, J. and Leijnen, S. (2013). Combinatorial and Exploratory
Creativity in Procedural Content Generation. In Workshop Proceedings of the 8th International Confer-
ence on the Foundations of Digital Games, May 14-17, 2013, Chania, Greece, ISBN 78-0-9913982-1-8.
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based on cellular automata [88], transformational grammars [41], evolutionary algo-
rithms [158], or answer set programming [147]. Researchers have also explored the way
procedural content generation can be used to create smart, “mixed-initiative” design
tools to boost developer productivity [146, 148], automate the exploration of design
spaces [123] or generate rhetorical mechanics [159], to name just a few examples.
In most (if not all) applications of procedural content generation, the computer
is responsible for finding solutions to design problems posed by the game’s context,
player’s action, or designer’s direction. In general, algorithms that can come up with
the most original and useful solutions will be considered best, especially if the solutions
are found fast and make sense within the context of the game, while they are still
able to surprise both players and designers. This chapter explores what it means
for an algorithm to be creative, and how a more thorough understanding of artificial
creativity can guide the design of new procedural content generation algorithms and
tools. The chapter sketches a new approach to procedural content generation that splits
the creative process into two separate steps. Two simple experiments illustrate how
this approach can be applied to procedural content generation. In the final sections,
the chapter discusses how this approach might be used to measure the creativity of an
algorithm, and how this approach can be used to improve automated game design tools
that use procedural content generation techniques.
8.2 Designing for Creativity
Creative computational systems are sometimes modeled after a simplified evolutionary
process, in which predefined sets of parameters are optimized in accordance with a
selection function [82]. When these systems are used in PCG design tools, the choice
of parameters and selection function becomes an optimization problem of its own: the
designer of creative systems is required to balance out several features, such as
1. The size and structure of the solution space;
2. The method for generating new solutions;
3. The amount of time available for finding a sufficient solution;
4. The criteria for deeming a solution sufficient.
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In computational creativity research, a distinction is often made between combinato-
rial creativity (combination of two previously unconnected elements) and exploratory
creativity (exploration of an established conceptual space or style)[15, 120]. This paper
deals with the transition from combinatorial to exploratory creativity: how can game
designers develop procedural generation tools that go beyond merely permutating a set
variables, while maintaining scalability and tractability?
A second useful definition is the distinction between novelty and usefulness [117].
These terms are reflected in the optimization design problem outlined above – i.e. “how
are new solutions generated?” (novelty) “what constitutes a solution?” (usefulness).
This suggests that the generation of novelty and the generation of usefulness might
be split into two different algorithms, and that the combination of those algorithms
alongside the human design process allow for optimization of design at a higher level. At
this level, the particular combination of quantitative factors (e.g. algorithm execution
time, computational memory, human design time) and qualitative factors (i.e. novelty,
usefulness) determine whether the creative process is combinatorial or exploratory.
In the approach taken here, a simple algorithm (the generation step) is responsible for
generating a wide variety of data using a simple combinatorial logic. A second algorithm
(the resolution step) is responsible for reorganizing the data into usable content for the
game. Together, these two steps cooperate to push the creativity of the algorithm
toward exploratory creativity.
Dividing the process into two steps with a clear division of responsibilities between
them, has four important advantages:
1. The generation step becomes trivial to design and implement. In ideal situations
any random combination will do, and in practice only a few simple constraints
need to be taken into account.
2. The novelty of the produced content can be determined early on and before the
computationally more expensive resolution algorithm is executed.
3. The designer of the generation algorithm only has to focus on specifying the struc-
tures that are allowed by the game. The designer does not have to specify all the
possible combinations of structures, or how these combinations are to be gener-
ated.
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4. The generation algorithm can be easily replaced by a different source of novelty.
For example, it can be handcrafted by a designer, or produced in response to
player performance.
8.3 Experiments
Previous research into procedural content generation has led to the development of
Ludoscope [43]. Ludoscope is an experimental program that uses transformational
grammars to generate content. It allows designers to create different types of gram-
mars (string grammars, graph grammars, tile grammars, and shape grammars), and set
up different recipes to generate content tailored toward a particular game. An impor-
tant design feature of the program is its ability to split procedural content generation
into multiple steps. Each step can be specified by different grammars, and produces
different models that represent a game’s content during various stages of its generation.
Ludoscope’s multi-step grammar-based operations and its relation to model driven en-
gineering as a general approach to procedural content generation has been reported
previously [41, 42].
Initially, no changes to Ludoscope were needed to set up a number of experiments
to test our assumptions about simple generation of variety, combined with a more
sophisticated resolution algorithm to generate a useful data set. The first experiment
used a simple tile based grammar to generate dungeons that might be used in a roguelike
game. The generation step simply produced a tile map randomly filled with walls and
open spaces, except on the borders, which would always be walls (see figure 8.1). For
this experiment, the chance that a tile (except those on the edge) was set to a wall was
40%. The resolution applies a simple transformation grammar (figure 8.3) to structure
the random set into something that is more usable for a game (see figure 8.2). It is
interesting to note that the results of the resolution slightly differ as the rules in the
transformation grammar are applied randomly, by selecting one possible transformation
from all possible transformations every step. However, they do not differ as much as
one might expect from a random application of transformation rules: the grammar
converges on a number of stable solutions.
In many ways, the grammar for the resolution step acts as a cellular automaton:
locally defined rules, depending on a tile’s neighbors, change open spaces to walls and
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Figure 8.1: Randomly generated set of walls and open spaces to create a dungeon.
vice versa. However, it is important to note that the grammar used in the resolution
step does not change the number of walls and open spaces as cellular automata would.
Open spaces and walls might swap places, but their total number does not change. This
feature is important when the same techniques are used to generate other elements in
the dungeon at the same time. For example, when the number of monsters, doors and
traps is determined using the same generation step.
The second experiment involves the generation of lock and key mission structures.
In this case, the generation step produces a string of tasks. The string always starts
with an “entrance” and ends with a “goal” to represent the start and end points for
the level. In addition, the first task is always a key and the last task is always a lock.
This guarantees that any lock is preceded by at least one key and any key is followed
by at least one lock. The intermediate tasks are randomly set to contain locks, keys
or other task with a ratio of 25%, 25% and 50% (see figure 8.4). Next, the resolution
step generates a structure in which each key is associated to at least one lock (and vice
versa), and in which the initial sequence of locks, keys and other tasks is preserved (see
figures 8.5 and 8.6). Note that the grammar in figure 8.6 does not change the number
or types of nodes, it only changes their connections.
An important difference between this experiment and the previous experiment is
that in this case the resolution step really does produces even fewer solutions for a par-
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Figure 8.2: Sample results after the application an exploratory grammar to create more
structure.
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Figure 8.3: The transformation rules used to produce the results in figure 8.2 from the
input in figure 8.1.
ticular generated set of locks and keys. This is guaranteed by executing each individual
rule in the resolution grammar until they can no longer be applied to the mission struc-
ture. The rules are executed as they appear in figure 8.6. In many cases the generated
structure is always the same; for each input there is one result. In certain cases different
solutions can occur: for each iteration of the grammar execution a random applicable
transformation is selected from the set of all applicable transformations. In the case of
multiple keys followed by multiple locks, this leads to different possible applications of
rule 5 in figure 8.6, because in that case, several keys might match node number 2 in
the left-hand pattern of that rule.
A notable outcome of the second experiment is the ease with which the grammars
generate a wide variety of different mission structures. The resolution grammar does
not dictate how many keys are required to open a single lock, or how often it can
be used to open multiple locks. Previous experiments with lock and key generation
grammars required much more sophisticated grammars [41], yet did not generate the
same variety of possible lock and key structures.
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Figure 8.4: Randomly generated mission containing locks and keys (E = entrance,
G = goal, L = lock, K = key, R = empty room).
Figure 8.5: Sample result after the application a resolution grammar to create a spatial
structure in which the mission of figure 8.4 is likely traversal. In this diagram, green arrows
indicate which keys unlock which locks, where multiple keys might be required to unlock
a single lock.
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Figure 8.6: The transformation rules used to produce the results in figure 8.5.
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8.4 Tailoring PCG Tools
One important result of the new approach to procedural content generation described
in this chapter is a redesign of Ludoscope. Ludoscope originally was first and foremost
a tool that helps designers create transformation grammars and experiment with dif-
ferent ways of executing multiple transformations. It was most relevant as a tool to
design procedural content generation procedures for games. By explicitly supporting
generation and resolution steps into this process, Ludoscope changed into a tool that
fits in with “mixed-initiative” design tools [148], making it more relevant for game
development as a generic content production tool.
The most important change is the creation of input and output channels in the
tool’s main window (see figure 8.7). A designer is able to modify the model in the
input channel (in the top half). Ludoscope uses that input to create an output. The
output can be the result of the execution of a single transformation grammar, or a more
complex procedure specified by a recipe that is able to execute multiple grammars and
apply other special operations such as converting a graph to a figure consisting of two-
dimensional shapes. Depending on the speed of the transformation, the output can be
generated in response to any change in the input in real time.
For example, the output generated in figure 8.7 might represent a simple level for
a platform game. In this case the designer specified the location of platforms in the
input channel, and the transformation grammar fills in the details to create the complete
level. In this case, the designer executes the generation step manually and Ludoscope
responds by filling the details; it executes the resolution step. This set-up allows a
designer to explore different possibilities for distribution of platforms much faster than
normally would be possible. In addition, grammars can be designed in such way that
it takes into account the distance a player might be able to jump in order to make sure
the level remains playable. At the moment of writing, we have only started to explore
the possibilities this new approach brings.
Distinguishing between generation and the resolution steps during content genera-
tion also makes it easier to change the source of variety for the algorithm. The variety
can also be deliberately designed manually, as is the case in Ludoscope. In addition,
as was illustrated with the experiments above, simple random selection of elements
already work if the resolution step is powerful enough to deal with (almost) all possible
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Figure 8.7: Latest version of Ludoscope featuring input and output channels.
combinations; in other words, if its divergence rate is zero or more. An option that is
not explored in any detail in this chapter is to use player input to generate levels. For
example, in the game Infinite Mario [157], the locations where players jump, pick-up
coins, or defeat enemies, are recorded and used as an input to generate the next level.
Whereas in the original experiment, many odd and arguably less useful levels were
generated in response to player actions, the alternative of following up the player input
with a resolution step might lead to more a consistent and playable game.
Furthermore, generation and resolution steps can be embedded within Ludoscope’s
original design philosophy of chaining transformations to break down the content gen-
eration into a multi-step, feed-forward process [42]. In this case, the output of a trans-
formation serves as the input of the next transformation. In contrast to the previous
approach, the new approach suggest that each generation step is followed by a resolu-
tion step and each resolution step is followed by a new generation step. In practice, this
could mean that the first two steps generate a simple dungeon (for example the steps
that where used to generate the dungeons in the first experiment) and are followed by
a new generation step (for example to add traps, monsters and treasure) which in turn
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is followed by a new resolution step to make sure that the randomly added content is
useful (for example monsters move to guard treasure, traps move to narrow passages,
and so on). It is even possible that some generation steps are generated automatically,
whereas others are based on user input. In the case of a process where designers can
make changes to multiple steps in the process, this creates difficulties with reapplying
changes that are made later in the process, over changes that are made later in time but
earlier in the process. The problem is akin to allowing designers to edit multiple models
that represent different perspectives on the same artifact [165]. It currently remains
one of the more pressing research questions for the further development of Ludoscope.
8.5 Conclusions
Applying findings from the field of computational creativity to procedural content gen-
eration has yielded a number of interesting observations. Breaking down the content
generation algorithms into a generation and resolution step facilitates the design of
procedural content generation algorithms. Generation and resolution steps can be ap-
plied to a wide variety of procedural content generation techniques. In this chapter,
the focus was on a number of different grammar based approaches. It is possible that
cellular automata and evolutionary algorithms might equally benefit from separate gen-
eration and resolution steps. For instance, evolutionary algorithms might be applied
to generate interesting inputs before they are forwarded to a resolution algorithm.
This approach offers opportunities to determine the novelty and usefulness of a
generated solution early on, before the more computationally expensive resolution step
is executed. This may speed up the generation procedure as a whole considerably.
Ideally, the resolution step is designed not to converge or diverge any further but
to stabilize the variety. This makes the resolution highly controllable and suggests
new opportunities to create mixed initiative design tools. In this case, designers are
responsible for creating new content while tools automatically resolve the designer’s
input according to the game’s constraints.
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Ever since he discovered how to make fire, man has stared into its flames. How often did
their twisting and twirling movements remind one of a snake seizing its own tail? And
how often did they bring to mind the circular structures of benzene rings? Kekule´’s
story is testimony of how far his mind must have diverged while dozing off, allowing
him to associate flames with snakes and benzene rings. His moment of insight, however,
was all but soporific: the immediate recognition of the value of the discovery is perhaps
the most striking aspect of his introspective account, and also precisely what separates
him from his fire-gazing predecessors.
In Part I: Creativity in an Artificial Agent Society, the relation between the con-
ditions and consequences of historical creativity are investigated by means of a series
of computer simulation experiments. The abilities of original individuals like Kekule´,
the hopes, dreams and failures that so often make their stories unique and fascinating:
these have all been compressed into a few variables such as “innovation rate”, in or-
der to keep the simulation computationally and programmatically tractable. However,
rather than abandoning personal creativity altogether, it is merely bracketed out in the
first part to make an experimental study of originality in a society of agents possible -
only to resurface in the second part of this thesis.
The results described in Chapter 3 show that there exist both benefits and draw-
backs to creation in a simulated agent environment. When these results were first
published, they found their way to a number of internet forums where they sparked a
discussion about the amount of time people should spend creating, for society to benefit
most. Though an interesting topic in its own right, the conclusions drawn were beside
127
EPILOGUE
the actual point of the paper: the findings that reported optimal creative conditions
for a simulated multi-agent system cannot be directly transferred to actual groups of
people, due to the limited representational scope that a simulation allows. Instead,
what these findings do show is that imitation may enhance creativity for a group, as it
prevents promising solutions from breaking up by acting as a memory pool, thus sug-
gesting there may exist an ideal balance between innovation and imitation, and what
conditions this balance may depend on.
Studying the profusion of ideas at the level of society allowed us to find other
dynamical patterns emerging from a variety of agent interactions. Creative leadership
was found to most beneficial to uncreative teams, while for creative teams, the leader
should pick out the best ideas and imitate them. We also found that clustering creative
agents may lead to a local amplification of good ideas and consequently a higher fitness
rate over time, although it may induce the drawback of becoming trapped in a sub-
optimal set of ideas. Finally, our research suggests that divergent creativity in leaders
yields a higher average fitness in the short run, for instance in start-up companies; more
established organizations benefit from a more conservative type of innovation.
Part II: Creativity and Constraint takes up the challenge that was bracketed out
in the first part: examining and modeling creativity on the level of the individual. It
deals less with originality, as it focuses instead on what kind of processes are capable of
purposefully generating novelty. Chapter 4 sets out to computationally model a series
of chimpanzee language learning experiments, using a genetic algorithm to train neural
networks. The semiotic difference between indices and symbols forms the centerpiece of
these experiments, and it is exactly this difference which cannot be expressed accurately
by a non-hierarchical neural network model. Instead, the results suggested that an
emergent dynamics is required for indices to point to each other in a second-order
indexical (i.e. symbolic) way.
Chapter 5 provides a different but related argument against non-emergent models,
this time considering the theoretical possibility of computational transformational cre-
ativity that was more broadly discussed in the introduction to this thesis. Randomness
by itself is a poor substitute for autonomous purposeful novelty creation, as is deriving
purpose merely from the interactions with a (human) user. As programming constitutes
the generation of a specific set of constraints on a computational system, the challenge
of designing self-programming systems - that require transformational creativity - begs
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us to consider non-computational systems capable of purposefully generating and elim-
inating their own constraints.
Chapter 6 connects the endings of the previous two chapters, by exploring con-
straint in non-computational systems in order to explain how second-order emergent
dynamics may spontaneously come about. Specific conditions are necessary to gener-
ate constraints; even more specific conditions are required to simulate a model where
particular constraints are preserved. Over the course of the experiments, a carefully
fine-tuned environment is constructed where the particular shape of a crystal (a second-
order, formal constraint) is positively or negatively correlated with its probability of
continued persistence, allowing for a minimal kind of selective process, or learning.
What makes this autogenic model interesting is not the particular form that tends
to persist in the simulations, but the nearly unbounded potential of an environment
where a multitude of constraint generating processes take place. Similar to the encap-
sulation capacity of crystals, which only becomes a functional (i.e. relevant to its own
persistence) dimension in the presence of a catalytic set, these constraints may interact
in new dimensions that are not only unforeseen - the unknown unknown - but that
also serve the purpose of propagating themselves. The Autogenic Automaton forms a
stepping stone, albeit it a small one, toward an artificial creativity capable of purpose-
fully transforming its own constraints. Further research aimed at simulating, or even
physically realizing, autogenic systems may bring forth a theory of creativity that is
fully grounded in the natural sciences.
Of course, in absence of a solution to this fundamental challenge we need not wait
and speculate. As the final two chapters, collected in Part III: Creativity Support
Tools, show, the previously discovered principles and mechanisms of creative systems
may be fruitfully applied to other domains. Cultural evolution, though sharing some
similarity with its biological counterpart, lacks a clearly identifiable genotype, leaving
archeologists to determine what constitutes an artifact’s “DNA” in order to construct
a network (or tree) of cultural inheritance. Chapter 7 argues that the conceptual
relationship between artifacts, present in the minds of its creators rather than in the
object itself (an outlook it shares with the EVOC framework, where all innovation
exists in the minds of the agents and the interaction between them) should be part of an
artifact’s DNA. Chapter 8 examines how techniques for automatically producing video
game content may be improved by regarding them as creative systems. Alternating
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between a divergent algorithm that generates variety and a convergent algorithm that
resolves solutions toward useful configurations facilitates mixed-initiative design, as it
makes the content creation process more transparent and controllable.
The physicist Richard Feynman once proclaimed “If our small minds, for some con-
venience, divide this glass of wine, this universe, into parts – physics, biology, geology,
astronomy, psychology, and so on – remember that nature does not know it! So let us
put it all back together, not forgetting ultimately what it is for. Let it give us one more
final pleasure: drink it and forget it all!”. The anthology of artificial systems presented
in this thesis is intended to convey a similar quality: creativity and constraint are not
as far removed from one other as the common understanding of those words might
suggest.
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SAMENVATTING
Sinds de opkomst van de computer en het
internet in het dagelijks leven zijn we meer
dan ooit omgeven met systemen die in-
telligent gedrag vertonen. Intelligent ge-
drag impliceert echter nog geen creativi-
teit: computers zijn vaak geprogrammeerd
met een bepaalde uitkomst in gedachten.
Ook wanneer deze uitkomst niet vooraf
vaststaat, zoals bij het voorspellen van
het weer of het vertalen van gebruikersin-
voer, zijn de mogelijke uitkomsten vooraf
vastgesteld door de ontwerper.
Zijn ontworpen systemen in staat hun
eigen uitkomsten te cree¨ren en daarnaar
te handelen - met andere woorden, kun-
nen ze creatief zijn? De acht hoofdstuk-
ken in dit proefschrift, gepresenteerd in
drie afzonderlijke delen, gaan dieper in
op deze vraag. In het eerste deel wordt
een samenleving van creatieve individu-
en nagebootst die af en toe nieuwe ideee¨n
bedenken, maar die vaak ook de ideee¨n
van anderen in hun omgeving imiteren.
In deze simulaties wordt gezocht naar de
optimale condities voor het ontstaan van
goede ideee¨n, hoe de diversiteit hiervan
kan worden bevorderd, en hoe de creati-
viteit van een leider een organisatie kan
be¨ınvloeden.
Het centrale deel van dit proefschrift
gaat in op de vraag of kunstmatige sys-
temen buiten hun eigen kaders kunnen
treden. Na een theoretische analyse van
de systeemvereisten voor creativiteit, vol-
gend op een hoofdstuk over de simula-
tie van taalbegrip met neurale netwerken,
wordt in het afsluitende hoofdstuk van dit
deel een biochemisch model gepresenteerd
voor het ontstaan van een systeem dat
zijn eigen kaders cree¨rt en elimineert –
een noodzakelijke en voldoende voorwaar-
de voor transformatieve creativiteit.
In het derde en laatste deel wordt ten-
slotte ingegaan op een tweetal toepassing-
en die creatieve processen ondersteunen:
een applicatie voor het ordenen van pijl-
punten op basis van culturele overerving,
en een duaal model voor het genereren
van de inhoud van computerspellen.
Zodoende worden in dit proefschrift
vele variaties op het centrale thema van
kunstmatige creativiteit behandeld: van
innovatie, imitatie, taalbegrip, de rol van
beperking, en het ontstaan van leven, tot
aan archeologie en computerspellen.
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SUMMARY
Since the advent of computers and the in-
ternet in everyday life, we are more than
ever surrounded by systems that exhibit
intelligent behavior. However, intelligent
behavior doesn’t necessarily imply creativ-
ity: computers are often programmed to
achieve specific results. When the results
are not explicitly specified, the space of
possible outcomes is implicitly present in
the program’s design.
Can artificial systems be capable of
creating new possibilities - in other words,
can they be creative? In the eight chap-
ters of this thesis, presented in three sep-
arate parts, this question is explored.
The first part features an artificial so-
ciety of creative agents that occasionally
invent new ideas, but will often also im-
itate other agents in their surroundings.
Using computer simulation, the ideal con-
ditions for the development of good ideas
are investigated, as well as how the diver-
sity of ideas can be improved, and how
creative leadership may affect an organi-
zation.
The central part of this thesis deals
with the question of whether artificial sys-
tems can transcend their own constraints.
After a theoretical analysis of the sys-
temic requirements for creativity, follow-
ing a chapter on simulating language un-
derstanding using neural networks, the fi-
nal chapter of this part presents a bio-
chemical model for the emergence of a
system that creates and eliminates its own
constraints – a necessary and sufficient
condition for transformational creativity.
In the third and final part, two ap-
plications that support creative processes
are presented: a computer program for
automatic classification of arrowheads ba-
sis on cultural inheritance, and a dual
model for generating video game content.
This thesis displays a wide variety of
topics, ranging from innovation and imi-
tation, to language understanding in chim-
panzees, to the relevance of constraints to
creativity, to the origins of life, to arche-
ology and computer games; each chap-
ter representing a variation on the central
theme of artificial creativity.
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